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Preface
This chapter is one of several outputs of a research project undertaken between 2011
and 2014 by the Institute for Gender and Development Studies (IGDS) at the University of West
Indies (UWI), St. Augustine campus. Titled Politics, Power and Gender Justice in the
Anglophone Caribbean: Women’s Understandings of Politics, Experiences of Political
Contestation and the Possibilities for Gender Transformation, the project was spearheaded by
IGDS in partnership with the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and led by
Principal Investigator, Gabrielle Jamela Hosein, with the support of Lead Researcher, Jane
Parpart.
Additional technical feedback was provided by Project Advisory Team members including
Rawwida Baksh, Eudine Barriteau, Cynthia Barrow-Giles, Patricia Mohammed, and Linnette
Vassell. Feedback and support from Francisco Con-Montiel, from the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC), also contributed to the project outputs. Support from
the staff at IGDS, St. Augustine, and especially Tisha Nickenig for project coordination and
management, and Kathryn Chan for graphic design and layout, deserve particular recognition.
The project examined four strategies to promote democratic governance, women’s
rights and gender equality in the Anglophone Caribbean. First, women’s political leadership was
explored for the extent to which it creates greater governmental will and capacity to more
actively and effectively transforms gender relations both within and outside of the state.
Second, quota systems were assessed for their impact on effective women’s participation and
leadership in representative government. Third, the usefulness of national gender policy
documents for promoting gender equality was evaluated. Finally, the impact of feminist
movement building on women’s capacity to be effective transformational leaders within
democratic political life was investigated.
Each of these strategies has expanded the spaces for realizing women’s rights and
gender equality, created greater capacity (among women and men) to achieve transformed
gender relations, and shifted the gender ideologies that present resistances to women’s
effective political participation and leadership. Together, they reflect a core set of historical
struggles waged across the Anglophone Caribbean. This project therefore sought to document
the history of struggle in five Caribbean nations. It focused on specific countries where these
struggles appear to have been won. Trinidad and Tobago provided an appropriate case study
for examining the impact of women’s contemporary political leadership, Guyana for exploring
the impact of quota systems, Dominica and Jamaica for exploring the formulation and impact of
national gender policies, and the Caribbean Institute for Women in Leadership (CIWiL) for
evaluating the impact of feminist advocacy on women’s rights, effectiveness and representation
in democratic governance in St. Lucia. These cases thus investigate four global strategies for
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advancing democratic governance, women’s rights and gender equality. They offer insights into
transnational, regional and national alliances between states, international organizations, NGOs
and feminist movements, and demonstrate the relevance of national case studies for
understanding regional and global experiences. Indeed, the project’s comparative, historical
and case study approach shows that both regional and national case studies are essential if we
are to understand how democracy, the state and politics offer opportunities for and resistances
to renegotiating gender relations in different twenty-first century contexts. For a more
comprehensive summary of the project’s conceptual framework, methodologies and findings
please refer to the Introduction by Gabrielle Jamela Hosein and Jane Parpart, available at
IDRC and IGDS, UWI, St. Augustine. The following is a list of related chapters produced by the
project:
• “Women’s Political Leadership in Trinidad and Tobago, Understandings, Experiences and
Negotiations” by Aleah N. Ranjitsingh
• “National Gender Policies in the English Speaking Caribbean” by Deborah McFee;
• “The Patriarchal State and the Development of Gender Policy in Jamaica” by Maziki
Thame and Dhanaraj Thakur;
• “Feminist/Womanist Advocacy Toward Transformational Leadership in the Anglophone
Caribbean: The Interplay of Individual and Collective Agency” by Shirley Campbell;
• “Crossing over the Barriers: A Historical Journey of Women’s Political Leadership in the
Anglophone Caribbean” by Beverly Shirley;
• “Advancing Gender Justice? The Opportunities, Resistances, and Limitations of
Guyana’s Quota System” by Iman Khan
• “Masculinities and the Practice of Dominica’s National Gender Policy” by Ramona
Biholar;
• “Enactments, Contestations, and Possibilities of Women’s Transformational Leadership in
the Anglophone Caribbean” by Denise Blackstock
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Executive Summary
Gender quotas are used as a tool to increase women’s political participation.
Unsurprisingly, quota adoption was seen as an important means to ensure women’s access to
political space in Guyana. Consequently, after a period of extensive constitutional reform in the
late 1990---early 2000s, Guyana’s revised constitution set out enabling provisions that address
three main issues as they relate to women’s representation: extraction of women’s names from
the list; the minimum proportion of female candidates to be placed on a party’s list; and the
maximum proportion of geographical constituencies in which a party may contest in which its
lists have no female candidate. The Parliament of Guyana then enacted the Elections Laws
(Amendment) Act, No 15 of 2000 to provide specificity to the provisions. It is through this piece
of legislation that Guyana adopted a candidate quota in 2000 to ensure that there is a minimum
of one-third female candidates included on each electoral list. This chapter examines the
establishment of the electoral gender quota system in Guyana, the only country in the
Anglophone Caribbean to have taken such a measure. The focus here is specific to the
process involved prior to the establishment of the quota system; the struggles and resistances
in getting to “yes” constitute the heart of the chapter.
Guyana presents an interesting case study for quota adoption. Guyana’s adoption of
the gender quota was a function of key national and international developments: Beijing;
mobilization of the local women’s movement; and extensive constitutional reform. While it is
accepted that experiences in neighbouring countries can influence a nation to press for
domestic quota reform, this does not hold true for Guyana. The wave of quota adoption across
Latin America had absolutely no bearing whatsoever on Guyana’s decision to adopt its
legislative quota. Although the Beijing Conference was significant in this regard, it is really
Guyana’s unique sociopolitical history that lay the foundation for adopting the quota. From
1964-1992, Guyana experienced a period of non-democratic governance. The Guyanese
people interviewed for this chapter articulated a very rights-oriented mind-set, given their own
personal experiences during this period. Guyana falls into that category of countries, which are
only now able to shape a democratic framework, having emerged from a period of non-
democratic governance. The consolidation of a democratic framework and the recognition that
women represented a group that had to be addressed specifically explain the early adoption of
the quota in terms of Guyana’s return to democracy and its first round of constitutional reform in
this new era of “inclusive governance”.
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Getting to “yes” was not easy. The gender quota was one of many issues being
addressed during the constitutional reform process, so it was not given singular focus. In
addition, the matter faced institutional and ideational (religious and cultural) resistance such that
women really had to lobby just to have the matter heard. In the beginning, the discussion
revolved around a 50:50 ratio of women to men. A suggestion of no more than 60 or less than
40 of either gender met with fierce opposition, such that the inclusion of such a provision in the
constitution was considered a “forensic nightmare”. In the end, the recommendations of one-
third or 60:40 were, in fact, ultimately put forward; however, one-third is what was eventually
placed in the law.
Unlike the situation in other countries, Guyanese proponents of the quota system were
few. The general public did not get involved and it was a network of only a few interested
women who pushed for the quota. Now that the quota has been legislated, the issue of
extraction of women off the list remains. While one-third women are named on each list, there
is no guarantee that one-third women will be appointed to serve, as it is not mandated by law.
Currently, the system operates on the basis of asking the individual parties to honour the intent
of the law---not just placing one-third women on the electoral list, but extracting at least one-
third as well. The women’s movement seems somewhat de-energized on the issue of
extraction and notes that younger Guyanese women are not interested in the struggle.
Nevertheless, even though there is widespread disillusionment among those in Guyana who
engaged in the struggle for the quota with respect to extraction, they achieved the feminization
of the party lists, which is a critical step towards the feminization of parliament.   
In effect, the quota becomes a safeguard, a legal tool until such time as these responses
become systematic and systemic. This is precisely the objective of establishing such special
temporary measures, such that they will eventually no longer be special or temporary, but
natural and pervasive. Certain structural changes may be necessary, though, to assist women
with child care, for example, while they become involved in political life.
Quota adoption and implementation is not a case of one size fits all; what has worked in one
country may not work in another. The success of any quota system is country-specific and,
therefore, highly contextual. This is very important to note for any country wishing to institute an
electoral gender quota. Encouraging younger women is equally important, as are training and
education in the areas of women’s rights and politics. Women have to be prepared to fight and
stand up for themselves; the veterans must also be prepared to nurture the young ones.
Lessons from the Guyanese Experience:
• Guyana’s situation is unique, as the transition to democracy and subsequent
constitutional reform process created an entry point for discussions on the adoption of a
quota system;
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• Constitutional reform generally provides an opening for the discussion on quota
adoption;
• Quota adoption may also be approached outside of general constitutional
reform;
• Quota adoption differs from country to country, therefore, the successes and
failures of one country are not necessarily transferable, but may provide important
lessons in another country’s approach;
• The advocacy movement is crucial to the adoption of an electoral gender quota,
as neither government nor civil society may view moves towards gender equality or
increased political participation of women as necessary;
• Poor interest on the part of the general public on the topic of gender quotas is
certainly no reason for the advocacy movement to abandon the cause;
• While cross-party caucuses of women to address quotas may be desirable, it is
important to remember that party politics will usually always supersede. This does not
mean that they should not be encouraged; an informal caucus may still have its view
heard and will raise consciousness on the issue;
• The law must be clear and unambiguous as it relates to candidate lists and
extraction;
• In addition to including a candidate quota in the law, a placement mandate must
be included to ensure that a minimum number of women also makes it into parliament;
• The placement mandate must be included in the law simultaneously with the
quota, as there may be little motivation or room to push for the placement mandate after
the quota is adopted. While legislating a placement mandate should ensure
compliance, it may be met with resistance by some parties and party members leading
to the need of sensitivity training. It is important that the law is not drafted in a way as to
create a ceiling of women to be included. Guyana’s law is written in a way to create a
floor of one third, thereby making allowances for greater nomination of women on the
candidate lists;
• Adoption of a quota law is not sufficient; the government must commit the
necessary financial and human resources to ensure that it is properly implemented;
• Simply because a quota law has been adopted does not necessarily translate
into substantive representation on the part of those women who have entered into
parliament. It is not always reasonable, in some cases not even desirable, to have
women seek a women’s agenda;
• Quotas should not seek to place women simply because they are women; they
must also meet certain eligibility criteria. Tokenism should not be permitted;
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• Training and education of women on politics and women’s rights are important
to encourage women to enter into politics;
• Support systems must be established to cater for women who have family
obligations and wish to be politically active;
• Education and raising awareness on gender equality should begin in pre-school
to eliminate socio-culturally acceptable practices of gender discrimination;
• Institutional and ideational resistances to electoral gender quotas are inevitable
in developing countries;
• The process of quota adoption is not quick or easy; advocates must, therefore,
be patient and persistent.
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1.0 Introduction2
Female underrepresentation in parliament, a worldwide phenomenon, symbolises a
serious “democratic deficit.”3 On average, only about 20% of women hold seats in lower houses
of parliament around the world.4 Electoral gender quotas, meant to correct this deficit, are
inherently controversial. Nevertheless, approximately fifty-nine countries around the world have
adopted gender quotas over the last twenty years,5 with Argentina leading the way since 1991.6
While quota systems represent a means to an end – women’s political empowerment – both
the means and the end differ according to the socio-political contexts of the country involved.
1.1 Organization of Chapter; Ontology; Methodology
A number of people in Guyana view quota adoption as an important means to ensure
women’s access to political space. Consequently, this chapter seeks to examine the
establishment of the electoral gender quota system in Guyana, the only country in the
Anglophone Caribbean that took such a measure thus far. The chapter will specifically focus on
the process involved in adoption of the quota, including the struggles and resistances involved
prior to the establishment of the quota system. It will introduce important concepts, such as
gender quotas and types, and discuss some issues surrounding gender quota implementation.
It will also review activity at the global and regional levels for promoting quotas. This discussion
will then provide the framework for presenting data on Guyana,7 such as a review of the socio-
political background that preceded the adoption of a quota system, the country’s electoral
system, the choice of quota system types, and the challenges involved in legislating such a
change in the country. The final section of the chapter will examine and question the political
gains made after gender quota establishment.
The ontological approach used is this paper is derived from feminist legal theory and
feminist critical theory. Combining feminist legal theory, which exposes the male bias of law,
with feminist critical theory, which offers a space that women can “emancipate” themselves,
allows a comprehensive process of reflection and emancipation. The combination of the two
                                                 
2 The author wishes to thank the many people who helped her in the data gathering stage, including everyone who so kindly
afforded her the opportunity to interview them. Many thanks to Dr. Rawwida Baksh for her comments in the early stages of
writing, as well as to others who were present at our first meeting and provided useful comments. In particular, the author
wishes to express her profound gratitude to Justice Roxane George and Dr. Rupert Roopnaraine, both of Guyana, for taking
the time to review Section 5 of the paper and providing very useful comments. All comments received have helped greatly in
making the paper much more comprehensive.
3 Phillips, “Democracy and Representation: Or, Why Should it Matter Who Our Representatives Are?,” in Phillips, Feminism and
Politics, 228.
4 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments.” Correct as at 30 September 2012.
5 See Dahlerup, “Gender Quotas – Controversial But Trendy.”; Quota Project, “Global Database of Quotas for Women.”
6 See Araújo and García, “Latin America,” 83 and Pande and Ford, “Gender Quotas and Female Leadership,” 9.
7 Very little information, if any, is available via written record; most of the data on Guyana for this chapter was obtained through
personal interviews. Overall, the gender quota did not seem to garner public debate.
2
theories is also useful in the examination of rights issues. They can “rescue” the idea of
women’s rights by exposing biased normative assumptions and politicised knowledge claims.8
The establishment of a gender quota is a means of bestowing specific political rights onto a
disadvantaged sex, hence the idea of rescuing rights.9
The methodology employed in this chapter relies on a largely qualitative approach and
focuses on a case study research method, which is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are
used.”10 As such, this chapter uses primary and secondary sources of information. Primary data
was gathered from semi-structured interviews with approximately twelve to fifteen people from
government, judiciary, academia and civil society in Guyana, as well as pparliamentary
documents, constitutional and legislative provisions, and newspaper articles. Secondary
sources of data included journal articles, textbooks, Websites, and reports.
2.0 The International and Regional Framework for Quotas
Systems
2.1 International Instruments
As early as 1952, the international community recognised women’s underprivileged
political status and ratified the Convention on the Political Rights of Women in an attempt to
rectify the gender imbalance.11 Articles I-III call for women’s equal entitlement to vote; eligibility
for election; and entitlement to hold public office and exercise public functions. Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 reflects these rights as
well,12 but they are not gender specific.
The unchanged status of women in politics thirteen years later led the international
community to reiterate these measures in Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),13 including a sub-article that discusses
women’s participation in nongovernmental organisations and associations concerned with the
public and political life of the country. Article 3 of CEDAW promotes the use of legislative
measures to ensure women’s equality with men, while Article 4 encourages the adoption of
special temporary measures, such as quotas, to fast track the achievement of equality.14
Interestingly, the preambular clauses recognise the need for change in the traditional societal
                                                 
8 Persadie, A Critical Analysis, 2-3.
9 While the gender quota laws in Guyana are inherently biased against women, honour systems seem to somewhat mitigate against
this challenge.
10 Yin, Case Study Research, 23.
11 United Nations (UN), “Convention on the Political Rights of Women,” December 1952.
12 UN OHCHR, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” December 1966.
13 Division for the Advancement of Women, “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,”
December 18, 1979.
14 These two measures have been combined where legislative quotas are enforced.
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roles held by men and women as necessary to achieve equality between the sexes, noting that
tradition and culture have historically been used as a means of keeping women in inferior
positions.15 Despite these efforts, the status quo persisted globally through 1995. A review of
the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies of 1985 was grim: “The main trend for the foreseeable
future is the continuing lack of equitable participation by women in political decision-making.”16
Consequently, at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, women again called for
political equality between the sexes. The Beijing Declaration restated the need for women’s full
participation in the decision-making process and access to power.17 The Declaration’s Platform
for Action identified twelve critical areas to advance women’s equality, one of which was
dedicated to Women in Power and Decision Making. The strategic objectives in this section
called for governments to “take measures to ensure women’s equal access to and full
participation in power structures and decision-making”18 and “increase women’s capacity to
participate in decision-making and leadership.”19 The objectives requested that governments
set “specific targets and implement measures to substantially increase the number of women
with a view to achieving equal representation of women and men, if necessary through positive
action…”20 and “take positive action to build a critical mass of women leaders, executives and
managers in strategic decision-making positions.”21 Overall, the Beijing Declaration represented
a turning point for many women’s groups globally in pursuing political access and equality, as it
legitimised affirmative action measures for women in politics. The proliferation of quota adoption
across the globe occurred in the post-Beijing era after women’s groups were invigorated to
pursue more political access, representation and equality for women.
One of the eight goals for realisation by 2015 identified at the United Nations (UN)
Summit on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2000 was the promotion of gender
equality and the empowerment of women. The goal was identified as an important step
towards achieving gender equality.22 In its 2010 MDG review, the UN recognised that
“women are slowly gaining political power, mainly thanks to quotas and special measures”23
and reaffirmed its commitment to
Taking action to improve the numbers and active participation of women in all
political…decision-making processes, including by investing in women’s leadership in
local decision-making structures and processes, encouraging appropriate legislative
                                                 
15 Discussions on cultural relativism often feature in this regard. See discussion on women’s rights as human rights in Persadie,
A Critical Analysis, 48-55.
16 UN ECOSOC, “Monitoring the Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women,”
Para. 19, 4.





22 World Bank, “Millennium Development Goals.”
23 UN General Assembly, “Millennium Development Goals: Fact Sheet, Goal 3.”
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action and creating an even playing field for men and women in political and
Government institutions…24
While the MDG review seems to offer promise, it is not clear whether access to political space
has led to substantive changes in how countries address women’s issues.
2.2 Regional Instruments
2.2.1 The Charter for Civil Society for the Caribbean Community
Regionally, the two main documents that address the political and civil rights of women
include the Charter for Civil Society for the Caribbean Community (the Charter)25 and the Inter-
American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women,26 drafted by the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of American States (OAS)
respectively. The Charter was developed in 1997 as a follow-up to a 1992 recommendation
adopted to create such an instrument.27 It deals with rights, governance, freedoms and
sustainable development.
Three Articles address women’s rights either separately or jointly with other
categories as they relate to political activity, but there is no specific focus on the adoption of
gender quotas. Article XII addresses women’s rights generally, indicating women’s equal
rights with men in various spheres of life.
For the promotion of policies and measures aimed at strengthening gender equality,
all women have equal rights with men in the political, civil, economic, social and
cultural spheres. Such rights shall include the right: (a) to be elected or appointed to
Public Office and to be eligible for appointment to positions of decision-making bodies
at all levels of their society…28
Article V ensures equality before the law and, more interestingly, provides for
the adoption of “special measures” to advance previously disadvantaged non-
gender-specific communities:…3. No person shall be favoured or discriminated
against by reason of age, colour, creed, disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place of
birth or origin, political opinion, race, religion or social class. 4. A law shall be deemed
not to be contrary to paragraph 3 if such law provides for special measures for the sole
purpose of furthering the development and advancement of hitherto disadvantaged
communities or sections of the population to enable them to develop and realise their
potential to the fullest.29
                                                 
24 UN General Assembly, “Keeping the Promise,” 19.
25 CARICOM Secretariat, “Charter for Civil Society for the Caribbean Community.”
26 OAS, “Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women.”
27 CARICOM Secretariat, “Charter for Civil Society for the Caribbean Community.”
28 Ibid., Article XII.
29 CARICOM Secretariat, “Charter for Civil Society for the Caribbean Community, ”Article V.
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Article VI makes a non-gender-specific reference to the right to make one self-available for
political office: “3. Every person shall have the right to: (f) make himself or herself available
for nomination for and election to any public office for which he or she qualifies.”30
While there is no specific reference to the adoption of gender quota systems, it can be
inferred that it is acceptable from a combined reading of Articles V and XII. It is noteworthy,
however, that Article V specifically includes qualification as a condition for nomination and
election into public office, but it does not elaborate on what this entails. This vagueness in
language could affect the implementation of any special temporary measure that seeks to
nominate and/or elect a female into public office.
2.2.2 Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women31
The OAS Inter-American Commission on Women (CIM), “the first inter-governmental
agency established to ensure recognition of human rights of women,”32 brought the issue of
women’s political rights to the fore in 1948 when it drafted the Inter-American Convention on
the Granting of Political Rights to Women. In Article 1, participating parties resolved that “the
right to vote and to be elected to national office shall not be denied or abridged by reason of
sex”,33 as women have the right to equal treatment to men. The convention entered into
force in 1954 for country parties that submitted an instrument of ratification. St Kitts and
Nevis was the only country in the Anglophone Caribbean to sign the convention. No country
submitted an instrument of ratification to give effect to it.
In 2000, history repeated itself. The Inter-American Program on the Promotion of
Women’s Human Rights stated the following specific objective:
….4. Women's full and equal participation in political life in their countries and in
decision-making at all levels.”34
In 2009, the rhetoric continued. The Fifth Summit of the Americas, held in Trinidad
and Tobago, produced the Declaration of the Commitment of Port of Spain.35 It was noted
under the heading of “Promoting Human Prosperity” that women’s political participation is
important.
.…11. We will encourage the full and equal participation of women in the political life
and decision-making structures of our countries at all levels through laws and public
policies that promote respect for women’s human rights and fundamental freedoms,
as well as gender equality, equity and parity.36
                                                 
30 Ibid., Article VI.
31 OAS, “Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women.”
32 Ibid., “CIM Mission and Mandate.”
33 Ibid., “Inter-American Convention,” Article 1.
34 Ibid., “Inter-American Program on the Promotion of Women's Human Rights and Gender Equity and Equality.”
35 Ibid., “Declaration of Commitment of Port of Spain.”
36 OAS, “Declaration of Commitment of Port of Spain,” 4.
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The above-mentioned “laws and public policies” have yet to reveal themselves.
These declarations, commitments, statements and programmes all ring hollow if there is no
action to support their implementation in a meaningful manner at the national level. Specific
examples from Trinidad and Tobago can be cited to reveal the inaction that plagues the
advancement of the women in political leadership throughout the region. In July 2012, at
another OAS/CIM meeting addressing “Women’s Full Citizenship for Democracy”, the
Honourable Minister of Gender, Youth and Child Development made a statement on behalf of
the Honourable Kamla Persad Bissessar, Prime Minister of the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago, lauding the many “bold and concrete steps”37 taken by the government. Minister
Coudray noted:
The Government is committed to working through this Division [Gender Affairs] to
mainstream gender equality in all its policies, programmes and projects, and to create
the environment which will facilitate greater and equal participation of women in political
leadership and decision-making. As leaders, politicians and policy-makers we are fully
aware that without policy and implementation of those policies, our best efforts may yield
very little.38
Nevertheless, despite the historic election of a first female Prime Minister in 2010, the 1948
Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights remains unratified, the national
gender policy is still “draft” and no “concrete” measures exist to ensure women’s political
participation.
2.3 The Inherent Challenges with These Instruments
Besides the continued placatory and vague statements made in these international and
regional instruments, another issue is that in some common law countries (like Trinidad and
Tobago), international and regional law instruments are not automatically applicable in
domestic law, as they must first be enacted by a country’s Parliament and no real mandate
exists to force countries to do so. This loophole removes the State’s obligations towards
nationals in its territory and under its jurisdiction.39 The Honourable Madame Justice Désirée
Bernard, Judge of the Caribbean Court of Justice, noted convention implementation and
enforceability present difficulties depending on the relationship between a State’s international
obligations and its domestic laws.40
                                                 
37 Coudray, “Presentation,” 3.
38 Ibid., 2.
39 See discussions on monism and dualism where monists assert that international law automatically becomes part of domestic
law, while dualists assert that international law and domestic law are two discrete systems of law. It appears that dualism is
more widespread in countries of the common law tradition. See for example, Connelly, “Ireland and the European Convention;”
Kirby, “The Growing Rapprochement Between International and National Law;” Dupuy, “Dionisio Anzilotti and the Law of
International Responsibility of States,” 140; Toope, “Inside and Out: The Stories of International Law and Domestic Law.” See
also summary of the Convener on Article 4 of the Bangalore Principles, which deals with the domestic application of human
rights norms in common law jurisdictions.
40 Bernard, “The Promotion and Enforcement of Women’s Human Rights within the Judicial Systems of the Caribbean,” 2.
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According to monist theory, in international law, treaties ratified by a state for the
protection of the human person automatically become part of the municipal law of that
state. The dualist theory, on the other hand, advocates separation of international law
from municipal law, and international obligations of a state are not automatically
incorporated into its municipal law, which is supreme. For international treaties to be
enforceable in the domestic court system of a state they have to be specifically
legislated or adopted into the municipal law…. In countries where a treaty or convention
is not incorporated into the domestic law its enforceability depends in large measure on
the integrity and commitment of the particular state in honouring its international
obligations and undertakings by enacting the necessary legislation to ensure
enforceability in its municipal courts. Most of the countries within the English-speaking
Caribbean and which inherited the English common law and systems of government
adopted the practice of the United Kingdom which followed the dualist theory; hence in
our Region international treaties are not automatically incorporated into domestic law
upon ratification, and separate legislation and enactment of statutes are required to
ensure enforceability in the municipal courts of the state.41
This situation creates obvious difficulties and reflects the problems inherent in relying
exclusively on international and regional legal instruments to effect change in jurisdictions
where domestic law is supreme.
3.0 What are Gender Quotas in Politics?
Gender quotas represent practical means for achieving the democratic ideal of
inclusion,42 but what are they? They are legal or voluntary mechanisms that identify a
minimum number or percentage of women that must constitute the membership of a named
body. For the purposes of this paper, such membership refers to electoral candidate lists,
parliament, or political parties.43 The percentage for gender quotas seems to range from 30% to
50%. Sometimes, bodies adopt or promote the 60/40 rule, where no gender should have more
than 60% or less than 40% representation. Corporate board gender quotas are a more recent
phenomenon than political quotas, but engender just as much debate.44 The focus of this
paper, however, is whether political quotas are an effective means of including women in the
political process.
                                                 
41 Ibid., 2–3. Emphasis added. Guyana, however, provides a conditional exception to the rule as a 2003 constitutional amendment
allows for automatic incorporation of human rights provisions of international legal instruments upon ratification through section
154A(1): “Subject to paragraphs (3) and (6), every person, as contemplated by the respective international treaties set out in the
Fourth Schedule to which Guyana has acceded is entitled to the human rights enshrined in the said international treaties, and
such rights shall be respected and upheld by the executive, legislature, judiciary and all organs and agencies of Government
and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons and shall be enforceable in the manner hereinafter prescribed.”
The Fourth Schedule includes ICCPR and CEDAW among seven international instruments contained therein.
42 Kittilson, “In Support of Gender Quotas,” 644.
43 See Dahlerup, “About Quotas.”
44 See Pande and Ford, “Gender Quotas and Female Leadership.” These have come about only within the last five to ten years
and concern membership on State boards. While the discussion seems alive within developed countries, it has extended to
developing countries as well. See for example, Collinder, “Paper Recommends Board Quotas for Jamaican Women;”
Kowlessar, “Gender Equity in the Boardroom [Trinidad].” It was also discussed at the policy level in Guyana in the early 1990s.
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Gender quotas are seen as an “effective mechanism for improving women’s numerical
representation,”45 as “they represent a shared agreement that women have often received
short shrift in the nomination process, and an admission that a concerted effort should be
made to get more women elected.”46
The Nordic experience, however, shows that formal quota systems are not always
necessary to ensure female political involvement. The Nordic region became well known for
its (relatively) high and consistent levels of female representation, but this came about over a
period of approximately seventy years without the implementation of any legal quota
system.47 Instead, an evolving, favourable socioeconomic environment and critical acts of
interest groups facilitated the very gradual increase in female political representation
throughout the region.
The five countries that comprise the Nordic region have among the highest
proportion of female representation in the world,48 and all five have relatively low levels of
political gender bias.49 None of these countries, however, have legislative quotas. Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden have voluntary party quotas (not all parties adopted them). Denmark
and Finland have no quotas at all. Yet, all five countries rank within the top 15 countries in
the world for their high female parliamentary representation. Sweden, for example, began
this process in the 1970s.50 Friedenvall notes:
….no constitutional clause or electoral law requires any specific level of
representation for women in elected bodies. Rather, the increase can be attributed to
sustained pressure by political parties and women’s groups within parties and in
society. Also, some political parties, although not all, have introduced voluntary party
quotas. However, these measures were introduced from the late 1980s when the
proportion of women parliamentarians already exceeded 30 per cent. The take-off in
the increase in women’s representation occurred in the 1970s, before any voluntary
party quotas were adopted. It was not until 1993 that the Social Democratic Party
adopted the ‘zipper’ system, by which women and men alternate on the electoral
lists.51
                                                 
45 Kittilson, “In Support of Gender Quotas,” 638.
46 Ibid., 638-9.
47 Dahlerup and Friedenvall, “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track,’” 2.
48 See Table 1 below.
49 Cleary, “Gender Quotas in Europe and Latin America,” 13.
50 Friedenvall, “Sweden: Small Steps, Big Consequences,” 100.
51 Ibid.
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Table 1. Women in parliament in Nordic countries52






Dubbed the “incremental track,”53 this particular route is not the model that other countries
should emulate, as such gradual change will leave much to be desired for the need of an
immediate increase in the political representation of women. While it may have worked in the
Nordic Region, as Dahlerup and Friedenvall note, “impatience of women worldwide is
growing;”54 today’s women simply will not allow for such evolutionary political change.
Moreover, most other countries do not have such a facilitating socio-political environment as
the Nordic region. Revolutionary change, in the form of legal quotas, has the potential to
provide more immediate relief. Moreover, “given the pervasively gendered nature of politics
in many countries, only the equivalent of an exogenous shock could loosen the hold of
longtime norms associating politics with men.”55
3.1 Quota Types across the World: Legal Quotas and Policy-Based
Quotas
Quotas are often classified as voluntary party quotas, legislative quotas and reserved
seats. The difference between reserved seats and legislative quotas, however, is so nuanced
that it might be better to have only two typologies, namely policy-based or voluntary quotas
(party quotas), and legal or mandatory quotas where the latter is divided into two groups: a
minimum number of legislators (reserved seats) and a minimum number of female candidates
(candidate quotas).56 This is preferable, as reserved seats and legislative quotas are, in fact,
legal quotas, whether constitutional or legislative,57 and so should fall under one umbrella and
be differentiated by their effect as stated above.
                                                 
52 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments.” Correct as of September 30, 2012.
53 So named by Dahlerup.
54 See Dahlerup and Friedenvall, “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track,’” 21.
55 Baldez, “The Pros and Cons,” 104.
56 A similar distinction is noted by Larserud and Taphorn in Designing for Equality, 8 as well as by Dahlerup and Friedenvall in
“Quotas as a ‘Fast Track,’” 8. Dahlerup makes a two-dimensional distinction based on mandate (legal or voluntary) and the
level of the electoral process targeted by the quota system. See “Gender Quotas,” 325. Dahlerup also differentiates quotas
on the basis of candidates or reserved seats. See “Increasing Women’s Political Representation,” 142.
57 A subtle distinction may sometimes be made between constitutional and other law even though they may both be termed
“legislative.” Here, the term “legal” is used to encompass both.
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3.1.1 Legal Quotas
Legal quotas mandate all political parties, without exception, to institute quotas either
with respect to the number of women candidates named on the electoral list or the number of
seats to be allocated to women.
A. Candidate Quotas
Candidate quotas require political parties to ensure that a minimum number of female
candidates are included on the electoral list. Thirty-seven countries have adopted candidate
quotas,58 the highest number of any quota type at the national level. However, many of these
countries exploit a loophole in this quota system, ensuring that parties meet the requisite
minimum number of women on their candidate lists, but do not guarantee that even a minimum
number will make it into Parliament. To overcome this obstacle, more attention must be paid to
the “minutiae”59 of instances when countries effectively implement quotas to ensure that a
percentage of women on political party candidate lists actually get elected. Many parties may
place women at the bottom of the nomination list60 in unwinnable seats (or in unsecure seats in
majority-voting systems), for instance, unless the law is drafted in such a way as to ensure
nomination and election. Even sanctions for non-compliance do not provide the necessary
impetus to ensure compliance, as exemplifiedin France.61 Placement mandates, or “double
quotas,”62 could be a feature of the quota law to ensure enforceability.63 Iraq and Argentina, for
example, have placement mandates as part of their quota laws,64 which specifically prescribe
the ranking of women with respect to men. In some instances, rank-order rules, such as the
‘zipper system’ ensure that every other name is a woman’s.65 In other cases, parties may use
ceilings to ensure that a minimum number of women candidates feature on the upper part of
the nomination list.
B. Reserved Seats
Reserved seats are less popular than candidate quotas, perhaps because they
“guarantee women’s presence by exclusively allocating a specific number of parliamentary
seats for women.”66 Currently, only twenty-two countries have assured reserved seats for
                                                 
58 See Table 2 below.
59 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 204.
60 This refers to countries with electoral systems based on proportional representation.
61 Kittilson, “In Support of Gender Quotas,” 639. See also Sineau, “France,” 83-94 and “The French Experience,” 128.
62 Dahlerup, “About Quotas.” Dahlerup notes, “The concept of "double quota" is sometimes used about a quota system that not
only requires a certain percentage of women on the electoral list, but also prevents that the women candidates are just placed
on the bottom of the list with little chance to be elected. Argentina and Belgium are examples of countries with legal
requirement of double quotas. "Placement mandates" or rules about the rank order of candidates, especially at the top of the
list, are other terms for the same phenomena.”
63 See Dahlerup, “Increasing Women’s Political Representation,” 150.
64 Ibid., 151.
65 Larserud and Taphorn, Designing for Equality, 8.
66 Mendez, “Engaging in the Quota Debate,” 17.
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women.67 While the seats are guaranteed, it seems to give rise to an initial notion that elected
women are tokens. In other words, parties place women in positions of power but many view
them as illegitimately holding power, and thus they often lack power or autonomy to act. The
constitutionally-reserved seats in India’s panchayat system led to such an issue when it was
first introduced.
.…the quota originally intended to create space for women instead created a vacuum
generating a force of suction that pulled into politics all the women standing on the
brim of the political arena. Many of them were political activists in their own right,
while others were close relatives of shrewd male politicians who were prompt enough
to step aside and push them forward. This led to the phenomenon of proxy women
representatives in local bodies and made women’s quotas appear as a form of state-
sponsored feminism.68
However, while this may have been the initial perception, the situation has since changed
very significantly. Women elected into the system now address matters that strike at the
heart of gender rights issues, proving their competence to hold positions of power. As noted
by Kudva,
Elected women representatives most often pursued basic infrastructure needs: water,
electricity, roads, community structures for childcare, schools and health centers, and
housing. They also focused on helping people, especially women, get access to
services and subsidies promised by the state, including getting ration cards for
government subsidized food supplies and funds for installing smokeless chulhas
(earthen ovens) in kitchens or obtaining dairy cows. They were often interested in
ensuring that the subsidies reach targeted groups (frequently members of adivasi or
dalit communities, or disabled persons), and that contractors provided services
without waste or corruption. The main impact of elected women representatives
seems to be on increased effectiveness in implementing various government
programs and schemes. Women’s actions are thus creating incipient structures of
accountability.69
Women in panchayats have also been instrumental in instituting anti-alcohol measures in
certain villages.70 The relationship between alcohol consumption and gender-based violence
against men and women is well known.. This case study suggests that while reserved seats
may eventually lead to elected women’s ability to act and achieve greater gender equity, newly
implemented legal gender quotas may meet with resistance, and not always be well-
received. Moreover, the allocation of reserved seats can lead to inadvertent ceilings for
women’s political participation as parties do not feel obligated to further increase the number of
                                                 
67 Inter-Parliamentary Union database. See Table 2.
68 Nanivadekar, “Are Quotas a Good Idea?,” 123. Kudva, “Engineering Elections,” 452 also addresses the issue of elected
women acting as proxies for their male relatives when they form the “beti-biwi-bahu brigade” (daughter, wife, daughter-in-law).
69 Kudva, “Engineering Elections,” 456.
70 See Nanivadekar, “Are Quotas a Good Idea?,” 124 and Kudva, “Engineering Elections,” 456.
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women elected from the minimum legally required.71 Despite these possible barriers, this quota
type has also worked exceedingly well in Rwanda where women now occupy 64% of the seats
in the lower house of Parliament,72 the highest percentage in the world. This high level of
women’s political participation in Rwanda largely resulted from a favourable post-conflict
environment where there was a serious demographic imbalance favouring women and,
therefore, a disruption of traditional gender roles, and a mobilisation of the women’s movement
to get women into political power.73 A similar situation occurred in post-apartheid South Africa.74
3.1.2 Policy-Based Quotas
Policy-based quotas do not have legal force. Individual political parties institute them voluntarily.
A. Party Quotas
Individual political parties adopt party quotas voluntarily and write them into their party
constitutions. They essentially “commit the party to aim for a certain proportion of women
among its candidates to political office.”75 Left-leaning parties in Western Europe initially
adopted them, and this practice has since spread across the globe to parties of varying political
orientations. Sometimes, parties incorporate them into their constitutions even when their
country adopts legal quotas. Enforcement, of course, is highly dependent on a party’s will. A
successful example is the African National Congress, which adopted a 30% voluntary party
quota in 1994, the year South Africa transitioned from apartheid to democracy. This success for
women was due in large part to the party’s commitment to gender equity, and its adoption of an
informal placement mandate of a woman candidate in every third slot on the party nomination
list.76 Currently, women account for 45% of the seats in the lower house, and South Africa sits
in fifth place in the world ranking on the percentage of women in Parliament.77 Noteworthy in
this case study is that despite the force of law, the will of party leadership ensured enforcement
of the voluntary quota measure, as well as further measures to promote gender equality.
                                                 
71 See Mendez, “Engaging in the Quota Debate,” 17.
72 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments.” Correct as at January 01, 2014.
73 See Mendez, “Engaging in the Quota Debate,” 18.
74 Britton, “South Africa,” 118-122.
75 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 7.
76 Mendez, “Engaging in the Quota Debate,” 12; Britton, “South Africa,” 118.
77 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments.” Correct as of January 01, 2014.
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Table 2: Quota systems adopted in countries throughout the world78
 Legal Quotas Policy-based Quotas
 Candidate  Quotas Reserved Seats Party Quotas79
1 Albania Afghanistan Argentina
2 Angola Bangladesh Bolivia
3 Argentina Burundi Costa Rica
4 Armenia China France
5 Belgium Djibouti Greece
6 Bolivia Eritrea Italy
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina India Kenya
8 Brazil Jordan Korea, Republic of
9 Burkina Faso Kenya Mexico
10 Colombia Kyrgyzstan Namibia
11 Costa Rica Lesotho Niger
12 Dominican Republic Niger Paraguay
13 East Timor Pakistan Philippines
14 Ecuador Philippines Slovenia
15 Egypt Rwanda South Africa
16 France Senegal Spain
17 Guyana Sierra Leone Uruguay
18 Honduras Somalia  
19 Indonesia South Sudan  
20 Iraq Sudan  
21 Korea, Republic of Tanzania  
22 Macedonia Uganda  
23 Mauritania   
24 Mexico   
25 Nepal   
26 Panama   
27 Paraguay   
28 Peru   
29 Poland   
30 Portugal   
31 Senegal   
32 Serbia   
33 Slovenia   
34 Spain   
35 Tunisia   
36 Uruguay   
37 Uzbekistan   
    
                                                 
78 Information available from Inter-Parliamentary Union database. Updated November 30, 2011.
79 This is not reflective of the number of parties that actually have adopted this quota.
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3.2 Gender Quotas and Critical Mass
Gender quotas are intimately tied to the concept of “critical mass.” Critical mass refers
to the minimum number of female legislators – usually about 30% – required to feminise
political processes and outcomes.80
Originally, the term critical mass was borrowed from nuclear physics, where it refers
to the quantity needed to start a chain reaction, an irreversible turning point, or a
takeoff into a new situation or process. By analogy, it is said that a qualitative shift
will take place when women exceed a proportion of about 30% in an organization. In
this way, the move from a small to a large minority is significant. Thus numbers, or
rather percentages, count.81
Thirty percent is the “UN-designated “critical mass” required to maintain the impetus
towards 50/50 female/male representation.”82 The question that arises, as with gender quotas,
is whether there actually is a causal link between numerical presence and substantive
representation.83 One study found that the “legislative behaviour of women politicians often
did not match their expressed interest in women’s issues.”84 While legislative changes may
not be pursued as pronounced on political platforms, however, policy issues may receive
attention. Dahlerup makes the point that “there is enough evidence to conclude that women
politicians all over the world tend to be more active than their male colleagues when it comes
to placing equality policy on the political agenda.”85 It is important to note, however, that
while policy usually directs the legislative agenda, elected women may pursue policy rather
than legislation as they may be more comfortable pursuing non-binding statements on
women’s issues as a means of placating interest groups while not offending their colleagues
in parliament.
In a 1995 review of women’s status in power and decision-making structures, as a
result of countries’ implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, Women’s Environment
and Development Organisation (WEDO) confirmed that critical mass supports substantive
representation. “When women are represented in critical mass in policy-making bodies, their
perspectives and experiences are more likely to be taken into account and their concerns
given higher priority.”86 This finding was made despite the “deeply rooted patriarchal
structures…societal attitudes… [and] systemic barriers to women’s full and equal
participation in government.”87
                                                 
80 See Grey, “Numbers and Beyond,” 497.
81 Dahlerup, “The Story of the Theory,” 512. Emphasis in the original.
82 WEDO, “Beijing Betrayed,” 17. France has parité, but it has not worked as contemplated. See Sineau, “France,” 83-94.
83 See Grey, “Numbers and Beyond,” 495 and generally Tremblay, “The Substantive Representation,” and Dahlerup, “The Story
of the Theory.”
84 Grey, “Numbers and Beyond,” 497.
85 Dahlerup, “The Story of the Theory,” 518.
86 WEDO, “Beijing Betrayed,” 18.
87 WEDO, “Beijing Betrayed,”17.
15
Despite this analysis, it is worth examining whether the issue is perhaps less “critical
mass” and more “critical acts”88 based on similar ideational perspectives in a supportive
environment. The section below discusses this descriptive (mass) versus substantive (acts)
representation debate. This is not to say that quotas are not required, as women’s numerical
presence can provide a safer space for negotiating women’s interests and being heard. The
concept of critical mass would also provide the basis for arguing that gender quotas are
necessary to feminise politics numerically, initially, and substantively, serendipitously.89
3.3 Descriptive Versus Substantive Representation
Descriptive representation is necessarily reflective of the population as a whole, such
that, since women constitute about 50% of the total population, they should have 50%
representation in Parliament. Substantive representation, however, refers to the acts of the
elected, regardless of number.90 In the case of gender, does numerical representation
automatically equate to substantive representation? Even though a woman may gain access
to politics because of an instituted quota system, there is no guarantee that she will pursue
the gender agenda or that she should or that she should be expected to do so.91 Krook
makes the point that the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of
women “overlooks the fact that these measures are not feminist quotas but gender
quotas—and more properly speaking, sex quotas—that seek merely to increase the number
of women in political decision making, separate from any obligations to change policy
outcomes.”92 The expectation, of course, is that women politicians will pursue women’s
interests. Nanivadekar asks, however, whether elected women owe a primary loyalty to the
cause of women only.93 If women pursue too myopic an agenda, they may very well face
further marginalisation in an already very exclusionary arena into which they demanded
entry.
3.4 Getting to Yes in Establishing Quotas
It is easy to obtain data on the number of countries that have established quotas,
however, the struggles and resistances involved in achieving those victories are not always
known, or are taken for granted. The issue is usually exacerbated by systemic, practical and
normative gender-biased institutions existing in any country-context.94 Argentina, for example,
                                                 
88 See Dahlerup, “The Story of the Theory,” 513, who eschews “mass” for “acts.”
89 See for example, Childs and Krook, “Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass.”
90 See Tremblay, “The Substantive Representation,” 503.
91 Similar studies on the gendered nature of law and whether female lawyers and judges will represent female interests have
been conducted. See Persadie, A Critical Analysis, 13-18.
92 Krook, “Gender Quotas,” 111.
93 Nanivadekar, “Are Quotas a Good Idea?,” 123.
94 See Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, chapter 3 and also Shvedova, “Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament,”
33-50.
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is hailed for having opened the quota-adoption door in Latin America in 1991 when it passed
the Ley de Cupos and was the first country in the world to adopt a legal (candidate) quota.95
The adoption of a quota law, however, depended greatly on the tenacity of women’s groups
pressuring the government to do so. Along with forming strong lobbying networks, they
strategically used national, regional and international data that supported quotas in their
arguments to support the adoption of a law in their own country.96  The adoption of a quota law
was really the combined result of Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983, cross-party
mobilisation of women in Parliament, and the general mobilisation by Argentinian women who
adopted historical, linguistic and ideological affinities with women in Europe and Latin America
to help promote the quota agenda.97
Previously considered men’s territory, political space became an arena that Argentinian
women chose to enter based on information they received about women’s right to political
access and participation globally. Women in the country created a cross-party network to press
for a gender quota law in 1989. Female parliamentarians, inspired by these developments, took
up the cause and drafted two bills, the first of which was not supported. The second bill was not
addressed until 1990, but women’s groups, including a cross-party network98 of women, used
this time to lobby other women to work together and to convince their male colleagues to vote
in favour of the bill. During the bill debate, some male senators dismissed the motion as
“demagogic, high-handed, and anti-democratic.”99 Yet, what followed was a somewhat happy
accident. An overwhelming majority of parliamentarians approved the bill in a near-silent vote,
as most senators believed it would be rejected or lapse before any further debate in the lower
house took place. The approval led to further mobilisation of women around the country, with a
public awareness campaign featuring media personalities, and extensive lobbying across the
country that resulted in the then president of the country, Carlos Menem, pledging his support.
In the days preceding the lower house debate on the quota bill in 1991, feminist
mobilisation and lobbying increased even more. Women’s groups sent individual letters to
parliamentarians requesting that they support the bill, and women “descended on the Capital
from all over the country to conduct a “vigil for the quota” until the bill became law” at 4 p.m.100
The sheer number of women and their perseverance seemed to influence some
parliamentarians to vote in favour.101 Nevertheless, it was the president’s intervention at 2 a.m.
telling parliamentarians to vote in favour of the bill that signalled a dramatic shift in the situation.
                                                 
95 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 163. Krook details the struggles of six countries in her work on pre- and post-quota
adoption. See Sacchet, “Beyond Numbers,” for an exposition of the uphill battle faced by the women’s movement in Brazil.
96 Krook details the process in Quotas for Women in Politics, 161-81. Their ability to pressure the government is questionable,
as had they not had the support of the President (despite his motives), it is not clear whether they would have succeeded. See
also Lubertino’s insider account of the struggle to establish the quota system in Argentina: “Pioneering Quotas,” 32-34.
97 Lubertino, “Pioneering Quotas,” 32.
98 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 168.
99 Ibid.
100 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics,169.
101 This presents an interesting twist to Phillip’s notion of the politics of presence or even of critical mass. See, for example,
Bacchi, ”Arguing for and Against Quotas,” 36.
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Interestingly, the outnumbered parliamentarians acquiesced to the vote due to their discomfort
in opposing the measure any further. At 3 a.m., parliament passed the measure.
It should be noted that implementation of the law represented yet another challenge.
Argentinian women faced a fifteen-year battle for institutional and attitudinal reforms. In
particular, they faced a decade-long struggle to ensure that the 30% female candidate
requirement of the quota law  translated into the election of at least 30% female
representatives.102 It was only in October 2001 that the quota law was properly implemented by
the inclusion of a placement mandate for women.103 It was largely through the relentless efforts
of women’s groups and individuals – and, crucially, the support of those in power – that these
measures were implemented.
In Uganda, it was also the women’s movement that exerted pressure on the
government to institute legal measures to ensure women’s political participation through one-
third reserved seats (which, it has been suggested, was a show of tokenism for their role in the
struggle towards democracy). Cultural and financial issues, however, continue to keep women
out of the political arena.104 Similarly, South African women demanded formal recognition and
participation in politics due to their role in the antiapartheid conflict which had the effect of
disrupting traditional gender roles.105 South Africa saw the adoption of a legislated candidate
quota of 50%. It should be noted again that a very strong network of women groups existed in
these countries  that guided women political candidates on how to get elected in the post-
conflict era. In the case of France, however, where parity was legislated, women within the
various political parties pushed for increased women’s representation with little input from
women’s groups.106 Nevertheless, it appears that apathy, history, religion and political
conservatism conspired to keep women la deuxième sexe until 2007, when Sarkozy named a
record number of women in his cabinet.107 All of these case studies reveal that the adoption of
quota laws occurred largely because of the unwavering efforts and determination of women, in
tandem with support by those in power.
3.5 Electoral Gender Quotas: Yes or No?
With the proliferation of gender quotas over the last twenty years, the more
prominent issues surrounding the debate should be addressed. Needless to say, the
opposing camps are seriously divided on the implementation of gender quotas in politics.
Remarkably, opponents include members of both sexes. In 1997, Spain’s General Secretary
of Social Affairs of the first conservative People’s Party government, Amalia Gómez,
                                                 
102 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 180.
103 Ibid., 178.
104 Bauer, “Uganda,” 36-38.
105 Britton, “South Africa,” 118-122.
106 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 183.
107 See Sineau, “France,” 90-93 and Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 200.
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derogatively dubbed it “the wonderbra quota.” The government later explained away the
statement as “descriptive” rather than pejorative, and as meaning that the quota system did not
necessarily cater for merit but simply numbers.108 Whatever the motive for making the
statement, the issues of merit and competence are important in the quota debate. According to
Mansbridge, “In the United States, the very word “quota” implies the negation of merit,
individual worth, and fair competition, as well as the intervention of the state in individual
freedom.”109 Positive discrimination or affirmative action, regardless of the wrongs it may
attempt to correct, is “politically untenable;”110 the idea that a fixed percentage of seats must
be set aside with no reference to merit or competence is unthinkable, not to mention
undemocratic.111 Krook makes the point that gender quotas may delegitimise all female
politicians as political actors, including those who enter office on the basis of merit.112
Uncritically accepting merit as the acceptable criterion for political access often
overlooks “the many ways in which such criteria systematically privilege certain groups over
others, often in arbitrary ways.”113 Is it only competent men who enter politics?
While quotas increase women’s representation in politics, do women represent all
women’s issues? It is argued that “bringing in the perspectives of women to the decision-
making process enhances the chances for real change,”114 however, women do not
constitute a homogenous, unified group with similar challenges. It is likely that
educated, middle-class, dominant-ethnicity women…are most likely to be elected in
systems engineered to represent only gender proportionally [and] will represent
“women’s” issues primarily through their own experiences, which, although in some
ways like, will also be unlike those of women who do not share their class or ethnic/
racial background.115
Some non-gender quotas may include ethnic minorities to allow for greater diversity of
representation. Nevertheless, for these very reasons, the heterogeneous nature of women as
a group can pose challenges when attempting to formulate a collective legislative agenda.116
“Sex” (or “gender”) is not a category of political representation on par with other
recognized group identities.”117 Nevertheless, legislative quotas “aim to change normative
institutions by revising the meanings of equality and representation underlying processes of
candidate selection to permit positive action, foster more equal results, and recognise “sex” as
a political identity.”118 Moreover, in addressing only one dimension of inequality at a time,
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such as sex, quotas may reinforce within-group inequalities.119 Ethnicity, though, is
considered a relevant category of political representation, as “women and men belong to all
political parties; members of ethnic groups, by contrast, frequently belong to one only.”120 In
differentiating between the two, Htun makes the point that, in including gender and ethnicity as
political categories, quotas are better for gender while reserved seats suit ethnic groupings.
Quotas can positively influence women’s access to political space, but they have the
potential to be treated as a ceiling for the nomination of women candidates. For example, a
quota stipulating that 30% of candidates should be women is unlikely to result in a higher
percentage being nominated, and thereby in effect sets a ceiling to women’s political
representation.121 Strong wording, for example, sometimes inadvertently establishes a
ceiling for women’s representation if elites interpret positions not designated for women as
seats or districts reserved for men.122 Jones makes the case for quotas as a positive means
of addressing gender imbalance:
Quotas are a good idea in instances where women are significantly underrepresented
in proportion to their presence in the general population (i.e., approximately 50%).
This significant underrepresentation constitutes a very strong signal that there are
cultural, economic, institutional, and/or societal factors that combine to unfairly limit
women’s access to equal representation in public office. And in virtually all instances,
the only method that will redress this underrepresentation in the short or medium term
is the adoption of effective gender quotas.123
Furthermore, where there are more women, it creates the critical legislative mass for
representatives to consult with each other,124 allowing for substantive representation.
In addition to increasing women’s political representation, quotas are useful strategic
political tools to give a party a competitive advantage; they mesh with existing or emerging
notions of equality and representation, such as with left-leaning parties that work towards social
equality and countries in transition to democracy. They also allow countries to follow
international norms.125 Quotas are a form of compensation for historical injustice suffered by
identifiable groups – in this case women – and represent evidence of society’s commitment
to redress that injustice. Ultimately, they indicate that “underrepresentation of marginal
groups is not a statement of the groups’ poor performance but of the system’s poor
performance at creating a level playing field.”126 According to Dahlerup, women's experiences
are needed in political life because election is about representation, not just educational
qualifications. Dahlerup continues that women are just as qualified as men, but male-dominated
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political systems minimize women's qualifications. Quotas, therefore, can contribute to a
process of democratisation by making the nomination process more transparent and
formalised.127
Despite these valid points, quotas alone are not enough. They are but a “single
policy…a lonely policy, a voice in the wilderness.”128 Sheer numbers are insufficient; women
members must be able to articulate their positions and intervene in the deliberations of a
male-dominated body.129 The socio-political environment will also help determine whether a
quota will be successful or not. “Gender quotas may bring more women into the political
arena—but the dynamics of the process remain the same. In this respect, gender quotas
reinforce the status quo, at least theoretically.”130 In the case of France, for example, the first
post-quota national elections of 2002 brought few gains. Women still held only 12% of the
seats in the French National Assembly, as most of the major parties violated either the spirit
or the letter of the new law, nominating women to unwinnable seats, or simply ignoring the
new law and accepting the financial penalty.131 What is the point of equality in theory (policy
and law) without equality in practice (representation)?
4.0 Political Gender Quotas in the Caribbean
Compared to Latin America, gender quotas have not quite made their way to the
Anglophone Caribbean. The number of female parliamentarian representatives is slim in the
region. Table 3 illustrates that apart from Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, and Guyana, the only
English-speaking country in the Caribbean that has instituted a gender quota, figures fall
between 20% to as low  as 3.1% in the lower house. Even when both houses are taken into
account, figures still fall below 20%.
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Table 3: Women representation in national parliaments in the independent Anglophone Caribbean







Seats* Women % Women
Both
Houses
28 Grenada 15 5 33.3% 13 2 15.4% 25%




42 12 28.6% 31 6 19.4%
24.6%
87 Barbados 30 5 16.6% 21 6 28.6 21.5%
82 Saint Lucia 18 3 16.7% 11 2 18.2% 17.2%





23 3 13.4% --- --- ---
13%
105 Dominica 31 4 12.9% --- --- --- 12.9%









15 1 6.7% --- --- ---
6.7%
139 Belize 32 1 3.1% 13 5 38.5% 13.3%
* Figures correspond to the number of seats filled in country parliaments on January 0 1, 2014).132
+ Corrected to reflect the number of elected members.
4.1 The Anglophone Caribbean: Jamaica, The Bahamas, Trinidad and
Tobago and Belize
4.1.1 Jamaica
In 2010, Jamaica introduced a measure to address women’s poor representation in
politics. The government published its national gender policy indicating that it would adopt
“temporary special measures to accelerate de facto equality between men and women…and
[this] shall not be considered discriminatory.”133 This aligns with the country’s obligations
under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The
policy addresses women’s representation not only in Parliament but also on state boards.
According to the National Policy for Gender Equality,
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….the GOJ [Government of Jamaica] shall use TSMs [Temporary Special Measures],
such as legislated gender quotas, to address the lack of proportional representation
of women in Parliament. Such a measure could require a thirty percent (30%)
minimum distribution of women among persons appointed to the Senate and the
board of public bodies.134
51% Coalition: Development and Empowerment through Equity, a newly-formed local alliance
of women’s organisations and individuals advocating the implementation of a gender quota,
welcomed this pronouncement. The goal of 51% Coalition is for “no gender to have more
than 60 percent and no less than 40 percent of seats in the Senate or on boards.”135 The
Coalition would also like to see women sitting on private-sector boards. Recognizing
women’s critical role in national development drives, the organization made the point that
“quotas are central to the conversation about economic development, and to recognizing
gender equality as smart economics.”136
4.1.2 The Bahamas
The Bahamas has also brought up the issue of gender quotas, but not as specifically as
Jamaica. The government’s lone female cabinet Minister indicated the need for “stronger
female presence, particularly in top tier positions” and that she would “support the exploration of
a temporary gender quota in The Bahamas.”137 The issue, however, is not that simple.
Women’s inclusion in political leadership appears to require “substantial systematic
reform,”138such as access to campaign financing. Women currently have poor access to
campaign financing. If “electorate financing [is] tied to a quota system”139 this can possibly
increase women’s political participation. While the need for reform is perhaps true of many
countries, the situation is compounded in the Bahamas by the fact that the women’s movement
may not be as engaged as it should be to push the agenda.140
4.1.3 Trinidad and Tobago
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which
provides information on democracy and elections worldwide, incorrectly states on their Website
that Trinidad and Tobago lobbied for the implementation of a gender quota in Parliament. The
Website states:
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In 2000 Independent Senator Diana Mahabir-Wyatt filed a motion in the Senate calling
on the government to pass legislation to ensure that all political parties be required to
select as many women as men as candidates for national elections. It was
unsuccessful.141
During a 2012 interview for this chapter on her role in this matter, however, Ms. Mahabir-Wyatt
indicated she was not involved in such an undertaking.142 Neither can any such reference be
found in the Hansard records. Ms. Mahabir-Wyatt did note, however, that while it was an item
on the international agenda at the time and the government was talking about it, it was “just
taken for granted that the most qualified people would get there on their own steam.”143 In
addition, she noted the majority of parliamentarians had no desire to change the status quo,
where men held positions of power. During informal discussions about the topic with fellow
members of Parliament at the time, Ms. Mahabir-Wyatt stated they had general “disbelief that
we would even consider it” and that “it was a non-issue, because it was almost a joke.”144 She
did indicate, however, that she worked tirelessly for Parliament to pass the Counting
Unremunerated Work Act, Ch. 19:09 in 1996 to ensure that the unremunerated work of women
(and men) was quantified separately in monetary terms and recorded in national statistics. The
National Union of Domestic Workers, founded by the late Clotil Walcott, spearheaded the
initiative and worked with Ms. Mahabir-Wyatt to introduce the bill to Parliament.145
Hazel Brown, Coordinator of the Network of NGOs of Trinidad and Tobago for the
Advancement of Women (The Network) confirmed that no one in the country ever took the
quota issue to Parliament.146 She did note that in 1996, Ministers at the fifth Commonwealth
Women’s Affairs Ministers Meeting (WAMM) agreed that all countries in the Commonwealth
should aim for women to hold 30 percent of decision-making positions in the political, public
and private sectors by 2005.147 The target, however, was never quite met in Trinidad and
Tobago.148 Table 3 outlines that women’s representation in Parliament in January 2014 was
28.6%, the highest it has ever been in the country. To address this quota issue, The Network
joined the 50/50 campaign in 2000, which is when WEDO first initiated the movement lobbying
towards women’s equal participation and representation in governments around the world.149
In July 2012, the Honourable Kamla Persad Bissessar, Prime Minister of the Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago, promoted the adoption of gender quotas at a regional forum. In a
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presentation to the OAS Inter-American Commission on Women (CIM) on the challenges
confronting women’s equality in Latin America and the Caribbean,150 she made the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 2: Adopt effective agenda [sic] quotas….Gender quotas are a key
tool to increase the number of women in office if they are implemented fully. They
need to specify a moderately high proportion of women, 30 to 40 percent. I think in
Trinidad and Tobago, we have 26 to 27 percent, so we still have some ways to go to
reach. And this is not the maximum, this is the minimum…. There should be 30 to 40
percent women represented on party ballots. Mandate that women must be placed in
electoral positions and ballots and include strong enforcement mechanisms as
well.151
This was not mere repetition of the rhetoric. It was a very specific statement and
positive recommendation on the implementation and enforcement of gender quotas in politics in
Trinidad and Tobago. No prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago has ever made such a
statement. A glimmer of hope, perhaps? While work toward gender equity is occurring in
Trinidad and Tobago; it is unclear whether such a definite and legal step will be taken,
especially during her term in government.
4.1.4 Belize
In its 2002 National Gender Policy, the government of Belize recognised that that the
introduction of temporary measures, such as gender quotas, may become necessary “to
overcome the deeply entrenched barriers to [gender-based] equality.”152 The government
also pointed out that inequality could also affect ethnicity, race and disability. What is
interesting about the Belizean approach is that the policy requested a cost-benefit analysis
of implementing a quota system prior to taking action. The analysis was intended to “ensure
absolute benefits to the traditionally disadvantaged population (in the present case: the
female), as well as net benefits to the whole population (female and male) (at least to the
extent that the benefits will outweigh any costs).”153 Cost-benefit analyses often accompany
the process of determining whether or not to implement a gender quota, but it is unusual for
the request to be stated in the actual policy.
Of the approximate 215 commitments that the National Gender Policy noted that the
government should honor, commitment 193 directed the Women’s Department to consult
with a Gender Integration Committee (GIC), and to forward advice to the government on the
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merit of setting quotas for the appointment of ministry heads and departmental directors.154
This approach is, prima facie, very objective and level-headed.
The policy addresses gender equity (not equality) in employment opportunities,155
and power and decision-making.156 With respect to the latter, the policy states that  “there
has not been uniform consensus about the merit of setting quotas.”157 The document notes:
….If a major motivation for women to be more politically involved has been a desire to
‘make a difference’, or to inject some different perspectives and priorities into policy
decision-making, the experience has been rather equivocal. Across the English-
speaking Caribbean, the entry of women into political office has often been perceived
as leaving the status quo unchanged, likely due to the pervasive nature of party
politics.158
While this may be true, women still should have the opportunity to prove or disprove
such a perception. Ensuring equality of opportunity by implementing a quota system as a
temporary measure can assist. It should be noted that a male consultant prepared the
gender policy document, which may account for the fascinating cost-benefit analysis
recommendation prior to determining whether a quota should be implemented to be included
as part of the policy document.
In 2010, the National Women’s Commission published a situational analysis of
gender issues in Belize. This action suggests that the population was gaining awareness of
women’s political participation at the highest levels of government.159 While the report
recognized the need to introduce special temporary measures to increase women’s political
participation in the country,160 it reported that the cost-benefit analysis of a gender quota that
the government requested in the original gender policy document did not merit
implementation.
….A Political Reform Commission was established in 1999. It spent one year
reviewing all aspects of Belize’s governance system and made 103 recommendations
for political reform. Included in their review was the recommendation to implement
special temporary measures to increase women’s political participation. The
Commission could not reach a consensus on this issue and it was therefore not
recommended. The Report states, “The majority of the Commission does not
recommend that a quota system for the appointment of women to public bodies be
enacted for Belize.”
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It is not clear how “the Commission could not reach a consensus” equates to “the
majority of the Commission does not recommend.” This seems an extraordinary leap in
reasoning. Despite this, the Women’s Agenda of the People’s United Party (PUP),
advocated that women in Belize should hold at least 30% of public office positions. As a
result, the government appointed women to senior public offices, including appointments
such as senators, CEOs of government ministries, directors of government departments and
executive directors of quasi-government bodies. This trend continues across Belize’s
government administrations.161
Firstly, it is not clear how “[t]he Commission could not reach a consensus” equates to
“[t]he majority of the Commission does not recommend.” This seems an extraordinary leap in
reasoning. Secondly, in the following paragraph, one should note that there is no mention of
the Lower House, which comprises elected members of Parliament; women are appointed to
senior public offices, presumably by the Government, but there is no measure to ensure that
they are at least considered for election into Parliament. Appointing women thus seems to
be a somewhat placatory move. While women now enjoy increased access to positions of
leadership, they continue to be largely excluded from positions of political power and real
decision-making. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this means that the quota
discussion has been dismissed; whether it will be open for discussion at any point in the
future remains to be seen.
4.2 The Non-Anglophone Caribbean: Haiti and the Dominican
Republic
While the focus of this chapter is on the Anglophone Caribbean, it is interesting to note
briefly what takes place in other independent Caribbean countries.
4.2.1 Haiti
Haiti recently adopted a constitutional gender quota. In 2011, the country’s parliament
amended two articles of the Constitution to ensure that a minimum of 30% women served in the
public service and within political parties. Article 17.1 ensures that there is a 30% minimum of
women “in all elected and appointed positions at the national level, in particular in the public
service. Article 30.1.1. requires political parties to introduce measures to enforce the minimum
30% quota for women within various structures of political parties.”162 It should be noted that the
Socialist Party had a voluntary gender quota of 25%, but the party seems to be no longer active
in politics.163 In her reflections on the adoption of the gender quota, the former Minister for
Culture and Communication of Haiti eloquently commented that “the quota is therefore a
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safeguard, an instrument, a legal tool until such time as these responses become systematic
and we are no longer constrained to refer to them because we are obliged by law to do so.”164
This is precisely the objective of establishing such special temporary measures, such that they
will eventually no longer be special or temporary, but natural and pervasive. Unfortunately,
women represent only 4% of the Haitian Parliament today,165 marking a clear distinction
between quota adoption and implementation.
4.2.2 The Dominican Republic
In the Dominican Republic, which has a similar electoral system to Guyana, women
seem to fare better than Haiti. They currently account for 21% of Parliament,166 although this
falls short of the 33% legislative requirement.167 The country’s quota system began in 1997
“where Law 275 imposed a 25 percent quota for women among candidates for elective
positions.”168 Reports indicate that after the country’s 1998 elections, however,
political party leaders negotiated with the Central Electoral Commission to guarantee
that women's political national representation would not be less than 25 percent, or 45 of
the 179 total number of seats for both houses of parliament, independent of electoral
classification. The decision, in effect, removed the burden for each individual party to
guarantee 25 percent women among their parliamentary delegations since there was no
longer anything compelling the parties to do so.169
Amendments to the Dominican Republic’s electoral code in 2000 increased the
requirement that women must hold 33% of seats in both houses of parliament, and added a
placement mandate.170 In addition, Parliament introduced a 50% gender quota at the
municipal level.171 Some political parties adopted 33% party quotas despite the agreement
they made with the Central Electoral Commission mentioned above.172 In 2002, however,
parliament removed the quota requirement for the Senate.173
4.3 Women in Positions of Political Power in the Caribbean
Based on the review above, the number of women in leadership positions across the
Caribbean remains abysmally low, even where quotas were legislated. Of the twelve countries
listed in Table 3 above, only two have female prime ministers: Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago. Regardless, this situation has not advanced women’s political power in these countries
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or advanced measures to attempt to do so, such as instituting quotas that assure a minimum
number of women hold positions of political power.
5.0 Getting to One-Third? The Quota System in Guyana
Guyana is geophysically a part of South America but shares cultural similarities with the
Anglophone Caribbean. It holds a brutal political history – “an interrupted democratic period”174–
but now enjoys political freedoms associated with newly-democratic countries. A period of
extensive constitutional reform in the late 1990s – early 2000s included the adoption of a
gender quota system, for which an electoral law provides specificity. After the latest election on
November 28, 2011, Guyana now boasts 31.3% women in its National Assembly,175 just under
2% shy of what the law requires. This section will briefly review the electoral system in Guyana,
and the need for constitutional reform; examine the process undertaken and influences in
moving towards quota adoption, including the socio-political context at the time of the quota
adoption; and examine the actual legislative framework Parliament established to institute the
quota.
5.1 The Electoral System in Guyana
In 1964 Guyana’s electoral system switched to List Proportional Representation (List
PR), which according to many writers, offers more favourable conditions for electing women
than majoritarian electoral systems.176 Under List PR, each party presents a list of candidates
for a multi-member electoral district, voters vote for a party, and parties receive seats in
proportion to their overall share of the vote.177 The National Assembly, a unicameral
legislature, comprises sixty-five directly elected members.178 Twenty-five members are elected
at the regional/geographic constituency level. Each of these ten regions has representatives
proportional to its respective population. Contesting national parties supply lists, known as the
“national top-up list,” to elect the other forty members. This “top-up list” attempts to ensure a
very high degree of proportionality.179 Along with geographical considerations, the lists consider
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gender, ethnicity, religion, and age to ensure the list has a proper balance of candidates. Failing
to ensure such representativeness can be political suicide.180 Region 4, the most densely
populated, includes the capital Georgetown, which explains the high allotment shown in Table
4. While a country can have open or closed List PR systems, the List PR system in Guyana is
closed. Ordinarily, in a closed List PR system, the party pre-determines the ranking of
candidates on the list and voters elect candidates in the order in which they appear so they
have an idea about the individual for whom they vote. In Guyana, however, parties do not pre-
determine candidate ranking on their lists. Therefore, the electorate selects a party without
knowing which candidates the party will select to hold seats in Parliament.  Even though
candidate names on the list appear in alphabetical order, this does not determine the
candidates who will be selected to sit in parliament.181 In addition, the largest remainder system
using the “Hare Quota” is used to determine the allocation of geographic and gender seats to
parties in the National Assembly.182Table 4: Number of seats allotted per region183
Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Seats 2 2 3 7 2 3 2 1 1 2 25
5.2 Constitutional Reform: Towards the Adoption of a Legislative
Gender Quota
Adoption of the gender quota in Guyana resulted from key national and international
developments, specifically the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing,
mobilisation of the local women’s movement,184 and extensive constitutional reform. Krook
notes that other country quota campaigns also reference international commitments and
experiences in neighbouring countries as contributors to domestic quota reforms.185
Interestingly, while Krook points out geographic patterns with respect to the types of quotas
that countries adopt and when they adopt them,186 Guyana does not follow such patterns. The
wave of quota adoption across Latin America had absolutely no influence on Guyana’s decision
to adopt its legislative quota. The 1995 Beijing Conference, however, seemed to be a
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significant influence,187 as was the case with many other countries mentioned earlier in this
chapter.
The imperative to adopt a gender quota in Guyana lies in the country’s political history
and the very rights-oriented mind-set of those affected during the period. The first set of
interviews conducted in Guyana for this chapter revealed people with a very strong sense of
rights, stemming from what many claim was a twenty-eight year period of non-democratic rule
in the country between 1964-1992. This sentiment was further confirmed on a subsequent visit
to the country to conduct more research for this chapter. One writer characterised Guyana
during the period of non-democratic rule as a “Leviathan state.”
The one-party governance had sacrificed the fundamentals of the democratic state, viz.,
constitutionalism and its constitutive elements (the rule of law, separation of power and
free and fair elections), for autocratic rule. It failed to substitute comparable institutions in
their place in order to realise accountability of the government.188
Some argue, however, that democracy was always present in Guyana. This raises the
question: what is democracy? Democracy has many definitions and, as James noted above,
the constitution and its derivative elements help to define it. “Liberal definitions emphasize civil,
political, property and minority rights. They also place increased, explicit emphasis on
institutional checks and balances, accountability to citizens, and equality with respect to
representation and participation.”189 At a 2005 UN World Summit, governments agreed “that
democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their
own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of
their lives.”190 The actual elements of democracy are noteworthy.
The core ‘procedural’ elements of democratic governance are often not contested:
there needs to be both competition and popular participation in the determination of
government itself. This yields a ‘procedural' conception of democracy about which
there is significant consensus in terms of the minimal conditions that would have to
obtain in order for the basic governing institutions and practices of a state to be
considered democratic. Competition, or "contestation," occurs most publicly in the
form of multi-party elections, which presuppose freedom of expression and
association, and a party and electoral system in order to determine government on
the basis of a peaceful, public expression of options and differences. Popular
participation gives meaning to the notion of ‘popular sovereignty' or collective self-
determination, and hinges crucially on the right to vote.191
Considering the definitions proposed above, elements of democracy include:
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1. a political system that chooses and replaces the government through free and fair elections;
2. the active participation of the people, as citizens, and in politics and civic life;
3. protection of all citizen’s human rights; and
4. all laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.192
Accounts of Guyana’s political history suggest that during the twenty-eight year period,
violent and deadly expressions of difference replaced peaceful public expressions, and
citizens experienced an extremely stymied ability to participate in free and fair elections, which
was evidenced by repeated allegations of vote-rigging and voter intimidation. Free and fair
elections, and the rule of law must exist to support the right to vote. Otherwise, that right is
violated. For the purpose of this chapter, the twenty-eight year period between 1964-1992 will
be characterised as democracy perverted or interrupted, where a charade of democracy
underpinned authoritarian rule.
Similar to other countries in transition to democracy, which have experienced intense
liberation struggles, such as South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda and countries across Latin
America, Guyana witnessed the role of women catapult because of political experiences and
tragedies.193 The struggle became more than getting women into politics, but more about
getting women to undertake a role as significant actors in the changes and dynamics of those
political environments. Moreover, viewing the adoption of a gender quota as merely a woman’s
issue loses the rationale for why these changes continue to take place in many countries.
Guyana, having emerged from a period of non-democratic governance, falls into the category
of countries that are only now able to shape a democratic framework. The consolidation of a
democratic framework and the recognition that this was a group that had to be addressed
specifically (just as Amerindians, for example, had to be) explain the early adoption of the quota
in terms of Guyana’s return to democracy and its first round of constitutional reform in this new
era of “inclusive governance”.194
5.2.1 The Socio-Political Context of Change in Guyana
For the twenty-eight year period preceding 1992 when Guyana returned to democracy, the
majority of Guyanese were subjugated to political, economic, social and psychological
suppression in a variety of ways.195 Violence during campaigns, elections and post-elections
consistently marred free elections in the country. The violence usually occurred along ethnic
and political divisions196 between the two main political parties: the People’s Progressive
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Party/Civic (PPP/C) and the People’s National Congress (PNC). Historically, ethnic groups are
strongly aligned to political parties in Guyana, where the PPP was the Indo-Guyanese party
and the PNC was the Afro-Guyanese party.197 This ethnic divide, as well as political violence,
predate Guyana’s independence.198 Assassinations of key political figures,199 journalists,200
riots, and detentions, ordinary citizen killings and torture201 characterised Guyana’s politically-
charged, highly-polarised environment. In addition, James noted,
The law enforcement bodies at times, particularly during the Burnham period, exploited
the criminal code and other legislation by prosecuting demonstrators for offences
existing in the statute law such as “conduct likely to promote a breach of the peace”,
threatening behaviour”, “uttering abusive words”, “obstruction of the police”, even
sedition or treason.202
As might be noted, such vague “legal” terms are open to individual interpretation and
have the potential for abuse (as seems to be the case in Guyana) or to be unenforced. Violence
characterised the second free election in Guyana in 1997, immediately preceding the
constitutional reform process. According to Roopnaraine, “The 1997 election came and there
was complete chaos.”203 Similar to most Guyana elections, people made claims of electoral
fraud. The Commonwealth elections observer group noted several shortcomings in the
electoral process, the most important of which revolved around the preparation and issuing of
voter identification cards and the tallying process.204 It took four days before the Government
declared the PPP the winner, even though all the votes were not counted.205 The PNC rejected
these results and refused to take their seats in the National Assembly (Parliament).
Georgetown experienced unrest and the streets became dangerous. Ethnic tension and
violence escalated.206
As a result, CARICOM sent a mission to Guyana to resolve the issues surrounding the
election,207 dispatching three of their most prominent citizens--“three knights of the realm,”---Sir
Sridath Ramphal, Sir Alistair McIntyre and Sir Henry Forde---to meet with various
representatives of the Guyanese people and receive evidence at Herdmanston Lodge in
Georgetown. CARICOM eventually brokered an agreement between the two main political
parties, which resulted in the Herdmanston Accord. This agreement provided a Menu of
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Measures which included “a political arrangement, whereby the PPP would concede to
reducing their term from five years to three years.” This conciliatory measure was meant to
facilitate the PNC’s agreement to cease the unrest, and accept their place in parliament as the
opposition party for the following three years until the next elections. The Menu of Measures
also stated the parties should discuss their issues; the former Attorney General of Barbados,
Maurice King QC, presided over this discussion as a CARICOM facilitator.208
Another very important measure introduced was that a two-stage audit of the election
process would be conducted, including a numerical audit and a forensic audit of the entire
electoral system.209 Justice Ulric Cross (retired judge from Trinidad and Tobago) conducted the
numerical audit, but not the forensic audit. When he released his report, he stated a
“remarkable thing”: his audit confirmed that the votes in the boxes that he counted were the
same as the results that were issued, but it was beyond his remit to say whether those votes,
the ballot papers in the boxes, had been put there lawfully or not. This, of course, inflamed the
political tensions.
Perhaps one of the most important measures emanating from the Herdmanston Accord
was that it specifically called for a legally-established Constitution Reform Commission
(CRC)210 with a wide mandate and broad-based membership, which would be required to
consult with civil society at large over an eighteen-month period.211 The tasks of the CRC
included:212
1. Publication about the establishment of the CRC and information to the public on requirements for
their participation;
2. Scheduling of public hearings and acceptance of written (and oral) evidence;213
3. Establishment of sub-committees to deal with defined subject areas so that all categories crucial
for inclusion in, or alteration of, the Constitution would be adequately discussed;
4. Engagement of experts;
5. Discussion by the plenary of recommendations of the  sub-committees; and
6. Preparation of the report to the National Assembly, based on documentation and additional
research.
Using these guidelines, the CRC spent the next eighteen months reforming the 1980
Constitution. This was important because the Parliament sprung the Constitution on the
population in a fraudulent referendum. International observers adjudged it to be, in fact, very
fraudulent. The 1980 Constitution concentrated power to an executive President, bestowing on
him “virtual imperial powers,”214 and ensured the then President’s control over the PNC and, in
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turn, the party's control over the people.215 For these reasons, all political parties unanimously
agreed, in 1992, to the need to reform the extremely controversial document.216 Constitutional
reform actually first appeared on the legislative agenda in 1991 but the person who brought the
motion to Parliament did not receive the required support from the PPP opposition party.217 It
reappeared as an issue again during the 1992 elections and in 1994 Parliament appointed a
Special Select Committee to address it. The committee, however, never completed its work
prior to the constitutionally due elections of 1997. The elections, therefore, were held under the
1980 Constitution.218
Unfortunately, after dutifully signing the Herdmanston Accord,219 the PNC did not live up
to their side of the bargain. As a result, in July 1998 Desmond Hoyte, leader of the PNC, and
Janet Jagan, leader of the PPP who won the 1997 elections, met in St Lucia to hold
discussions on the matter. The two leaders signed another document, the St Lucia
Agreement,220 which essentially reiterated the Herdmanston analysis and measures. Despite
six months being lost, the CRC was finally appointed in January 1999.221 Due to all the time
lost, however, the CRC only had six months to complete all the tasks that the Herdmanston
Accord and St. Lucia Agreement outlined to meet the legislative deadline of July 18, 1999. It
was within this restructured framework, on the heels of Beijing, that the gender quota was
introduced into Guyana. It is generally held that countries undergoing major constitutional
and legal reform have a greater window of opportunity to introduce quota laws than in
established regimes.222 The very strong rights-oriented mind-set of the political actors in
Guyana at the time also provided support for this move. Red Thread, a local non-
governmental organisation (NGO), recognised the “unparalleled opportunity” presented by
the constitutional reform process and ensured that its concerns related to the lack of
women’s participation in politics were heard.223 Gender quotas were viewed as a legitimising
tool in the eyes of the international community, as “the inclusion of women has become a
sign of democracy and modernity,”224 especially since Beijing.225 On this new-found path to
democracy, Guyana deemed it important, therefore, to include such measures in its general
governance restructuring.
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While the post-1997 period concretised the push for a gender quota, the views of rights-
minded persons on this issue germinated in 1985.226 Not only was 1985 the end of the UN
Decade for Women, but it was also an election year in Guyana. Moreover, 1985 signalled the
promulgation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies, which called for the empowerment of
women in all spheres. Guyana had a strong presence at this and other conferences, especially
from the PNC. This involvement influenced the number of women that the party selected for its
list of candidates to sit in Parliament, as well as to be ministers.227 There was also a strong
Guyanese presence at Beijing, which preceded the constitutional reform activity by only a
couple of years. The issue of women’s representation, was, therefore, very alive in the minds of
those who attended.
5.2.2 Sites of Resistance: The CRC
While the contagion effect throughout Latin America had no bearing on Guyana’s
decision to adopt a gender quota, the struggle to achieve it was certainly similar. As noted by
Sahoye-Shury, the women’s movement in Guyana struggled to increase women’s political
participation over the last fifty years.228 Only three women held seats on the twenty-member
CRC.230 This representation, in fact, only resulted due to the struggle of approximately fifteen
women who interrupted a Parliament meeting and made three presentations on the need to
increase women’s political participation. To avoid a repeat presentation, the CRC invited the
group to nominate a woman to sit on the Committee.229 The mandate of this one woman,
Anande Trotman-Joseph, nominated by the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers, the
National Commission of Women, and a small group of women interested in advancing the
issue, was to ensure that amendments considered by the CRC for recommendation for
adoption by the National Assembly addressed a wide spectrum of women’s rights, which would
become justiciable and enforceable.230  Although Trotman-Joseph’s mandate was to lobby for a
50:50 ratio of men to women, most commissioners showed resistance to this suggestion. In
fact, all political parties seemed to have a chauvinistic initial response, arguing against the
50:50 recommendation because Guyana already had existing legislation that protected women.
Some proposed  a constitutional provision of a ratio of 60:40 men to women or vice versa. The
majority of CRC commissioners did not view this favourably either, and a four-member sub-
committee report stated, “I have indicated my firm objection to any such course of action [60:40
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gender ratio]….The entrenchment of quotas or ratios in a constitution is not found in any part of
the world. Such institutionalised reverse discrimination will be a forensic nightmare.”231
Trotman-Joseph reported this to the women’s movement who then decided on a more
incremental strategy to advance a structural approach to quota recommendations. Professor
Kathleen Mahoney, who had just come from working on the South African constitutional
process, addressed the CRC. Special provisions were made for the input of local and foreign
subject-matter experts. These experts held briefing sessions with various CRC sub-committees
and conducted one-on-one sessions with individual commissioners.232 Professor Mahoney’s
specialisations included gender equality, constitutional law and international human rights.233
While the commissioners listened and reacted fairly well to what she said, some still displayed
attitudinal resistance, which made the intervention that much more important to ensure that
experiences and lessons learned from other countries’ constitutional reforms, as they related to
the inclusion of women’s rights, were understood. Unsurprisingly, a network of women in
Guyana also helped promote the quota issue. However, this “network” was really a select few,
and overall there was little solidarity among Guyanese women on the issue. The general public
was not involved in the process.234 The overall consensus was that the average voter did not
care about how many women were on political party candidate lists, and that the issue really
only mattered to middle-class and active working-class women.235 While the major political
parties each had their own women’s arms, this network comprised a “very informal, ad hoc
cross-party caucus that shared an interest in having more women officially included in political
leadership.”236
Prior to the 2011 elections, efforts were consistently made to encourage cross-party
caucusing. One of the key mandates of the Canadian International Development Agency’s
Canada/Caribbean Gender Equality Programme in Guyana was to focus on women in
decision-making roles at the domestic (household), community and national levels.237 The
program was successfully administered by country coordinators in their respective Caribbean
jurisdictions, including Jamaica, Barbados (who also worked with the OECS), Suriname and
Trinidad and Tobago. Vanda Radzik administered the Guyana Program, which was
operationalised by a Gender Fund aimed at bringing together different party women candidates
to attend a sensitisation workshop.238 Outcomes of the workshop included mission and vision
statements for the program in Guyana, as well as a declarative statement that lobbied for party
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lists to include 33.3% women candidates. All party candidates signed the list on the eve of the
election. Despite this nonpartisan effort, party interests superceded gender matters once they
entered Parliament to debate and vote. After the quota was adopted in 2000, few women
attempted to establish and advance this cross-party caucus when they gathered on a national
holiday (the weather was poor and so was the turn-out) to talk about the current electoral
system. Many of the women who were targeted to be part of the caucus were already on their
party lists, but did not really know how they had gotten there or about the electoral system.239
The Gender Fund provided support and resources to work towards the development of
a caucus as a logical outcome of the increased number of women in Parliament in Guyana, and
after the numerous attempts in the country at collective “common-grounding.” The idea was that
the caucus would be able to carry forward and fulfill campaign promises, many of which were
across party lines. Despite these efforts, no Parliament ever wanted a cross-party women’s
caucus, and no party ever championed the cause. No formal cross-party caucus or inter-party
committee to address gender issues was therefore ever formed.240 Unofficial cross-party
networks did develop to promote the gender quota, as previously mentioned.
Once Trotman-Joseph notified the network that she was making submissions about the
gender quota to the CRC in 1999, the women’s network in Guyana offered their support by
showing up at Parliament debates, listening, and lobbying. In addition, the network facilitated
public hearings on various women’s issues, including the gender quota, related to the gender
quota throughout Guyana to raise awareness of the issue and obtain feedback. The CRC, as
mandated, invited public comments through advertisements in the media.241 The network
capitalised on this offer and made formal written and oral submissions about gender equality
“because the methodology of the CRC took into account the frequency and gravamen of
submissions.”242 These submissions were very important to ensure that the issue of gender
equality and quotas were taken into consideration, as this was the only chance that the public
had to incorporate its views. Even after the formal period of scheduled public hearings, several
persons and organisations indicated that they wished to make extended oral submissions or
presentations related to their written submission that focussed on gender equality. The CRC
scheduled eight special public hearings as a result.243
Eventually, the CRC prioritised the quota matter and voted to determine whether they
should forward the issue to Parliament. Seventeen of the twenty commissioners voted in favour
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of the 50:50 quota recommendation.244 The CRC wrote up its report, containing approximately
174 recommendations, including the 50:50 quota recommendation.245 The report represented a
distillation of some 4,601 recommendations the CRC received during the public hearing
period.246
5.2.3 Sites of Resistance: Parliament
Parliament represented the second site of resistance in Guyana against the gender
quota. The CRC presented their report to the National Assembly, which convened a
Parliamentary Special Select Committee (PSSC) to filter the recommendations, and an
Oversight Committee (OC) to turn the CRC report language into constitutional language. During
the process, some recommendations were diluted and the “struggle over words violated the
recommendations.”247 The issue of why parliament should accept “token” women arose. A
parliamentarian committee raised legal and logical arguments, namely that women already had
everything they needed in law.248 At the time, the Commonwealth position was that women
should hold 30% of Parliament seats, therefore, the recommendation of a 50:50 ratio was
idealistic in the context of Guyanese politics. Nevertheless, political parties’ strong women’s
arms and the high visibility of politically and academically-minded women did not allow the
issue to disappear.
A helpful chance encounter occurred when a member of the UN Human Rights
Committee, Brian Burdekin, an Australian law professor specializing in national human rights
institutions, offered expertise to the PSSC on general human rights issues. Due to a time clash,
he was present at the same time women advocates were lobbying to advance the 50:50 quota
ratio.249 While he spoke in general terms to the PSSC about the increasing trend of
governments to advance citizens’ human rights, he inadvertently, and fortuitously, championed
the group’s cause because women’s rights are human rights. The argument that the level of
women’s participation in decision-making, especially at the highest level, is a human rights
issue was also forcefully reiterated at Beijing.250
During an oral submission to the PSSC, women advocates for the 50:50 quota focused
on the wording of the one-third provision,251 lobbying that it create a floor and not a ceiling for
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women’s representation in parliament. They also focused on the fact that political party
candidate lists are alphabetised (unranked); the need to ensure that the proportion of women
candidates increase from one to 50% by the year 2010 (this has not materialized); and the fact
that ensuring one-third of candidates were women on party lists did not guarantee one-third
women’s participation in parliament.252 The delegation further urged the OC to be faithful to the
CRC’s recommendations, which recognised that women must be adequately represented in
parliament.253 This presentation was necessary mainly because the OC did not like the wording
by the CRC’s drafters. Women delegates fighting for the quota presented data from the UN and
international conferences to illustrate that ensuring women’s equal representation in politics
was an international standard and Guyana should not allow itself to fall behind these standards.
After the presentation, certain OC members raised the question of how one could be sure
competent women would be elected, which outraged women who argued that there was no
guarantee that competent men enter politics either. This second round of resistance resulted in
Hazel Halley Burnett mobilising women to “descend onto the parliament,”254 and sit in the
parliament public gallery to offer moral support to the women delegates attempting to advance
the 50:50 quota law. The action resulted in restraining male parliamentarians’ urge to resist.
Burnett also briefly presented to the OC urging again for the committee to honour its
international commitments and take into account the Platform for Action that resulted from the
1994 Women’s Conference in Beijing. She reminded OC members specifically of paragraph
117 of the Platform for Action, to which governments – including the government of Guyana –
committed themselves. Paragraphs 117 a. and 177 a. bis read:255
….Provide equal opportunities and favourable conditions for women of all ages and
backgrounds on equal terms with men by encouraging their entry into politics and their
participation at all levels;….Encourage the nomination of more women candidates,
including, inter alia, through political parties, quotas or measureable goals, or other
appropriate means for election to parliaments and other legislative structures, to
increase their share and contribution in the formulation of public policy.
One view was that the women advancing the quota cause were talking gibberish and the issue
did not matter to them. OC members held consultations because their agency and donors
required them,256 and they did not want to simply dismiss well-known people coming before
them. Despite this assessment, Rupert Roopnaraine---political leader of the WPA, member of
the OC and supporter of the gender quota---indicated that the presentation was very well
received. An unprecedented representation of women’s organisations argued that the OC
ensure that women are extracted off the electoral lists to reflect adequate seats in the National
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Assembly.257 As one activist noted, “Why would we have wasted our time, effort and
intelligence to only have women put on the list? That is not what was intended. The point of it is
that from the list you get into the House.”258 Ultimately, the women delegates arguing for the
50:50 quota law were only partially successful, in that, the OC ensured one-third women
candidates were placed on the electoral list, but no law required a placement mandate to
ensure that one-third women got into the National Assembly. Despite this, the role of a unified
women’s movement and the physical presence of women lobbying the quota cause proved
crucial to this partial success. “At every step of the way, if there were no women to speak about
women’s issues, they would have gotten lost.”259
5.2.4 Sites of Resistance: Culture and Race
The ideologies that permeated the CRC and parliament are important to note when discussing
sites of resistance to the adoption of the gender quota in Guyana. Overall, “no public view”
existed on the quota issue.260 The intersection of gender with class and ethnicity/race
determines the manner and impact of women’s political participation, mirroring a process of
exclusion experienced by other marginalised groups.261
Moreover, “race trumps gender, sometimes even trumps class.”262 Many of the interviewees for
this chapter agreed that election issues were based on race and party politics and little else.
According to one respondent, “the electoral system is based on ethnic manipulation.”263
The cultural arguments surrounding the quota debate seem to have been based on the
racial divided. The PPP (whose members and representatives are largely of Indian descent), for
example, argued that in their communities women were reluctant to come forward and do
political work.264 Moreover, PPP women politicians were reluctant to offer support in the public
gallery when women’s groups were making presentations about the quota. “Indian women had
to persuade their men to let them come out.”265 “While Black women are accustomed to
working and fighting for certain rights and putting their spouses out, Indian men saw Indian
women as child-bearers and carers with no place in politics.”266 Further, “creeping conservatism
pervading religious communities” affected the extent of freedom and independence women
perceived they had.267 Beyond perception, conservatism favoured patriarchy in practice.
President Cheddi Jaggan thought that women’s role was to look after the children, not as the
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backbone of the party (Halley Burnett, interview).  Nevertheless, he eventually pledged his
support for the quota
The PPP’s lack of interest in electoral reform generally seems to be directly related to
the British government suspending the constitution and ousting the PPP government in 1953
due to American concerns of the party’s leftist policies,268 as well as the British government’s
fear of losing lucrative revenues from sugar and minerals.269 It has been argued that this
“foreign intervention, and a desire to see Guyana reach independence under a leader favorable
to western powers, generated an acrimonious struggle dividing the nation along racial lines”
prior to the country’s independence.270 Even the imposition of List PR in Guyana was a thinly-
veiled attempt to oust the PPP government “by reducing the advantage of Indian superiority of
numbers.”271 While these events may account for party conservatism, they do not account for
individual or ethnic conservatism, although party and ethnicity could be equated in this
particular case.
At the CRC level, religious and cultural ideologies also presented a foundation for
resistance to the gender quota. As mentioned above, 17 of 20 commissioners voted for the
50:50 quota recommendation. One of three commissioners who voted against it represented
the Hindu community. His argument was that women already had everything they needed in
law272 ---a statement that seemed largely based on religious and cultural conservative beliefs
that prevail throughout the Hindu community.
Outside of political leadership, Indian women today barely participate in decision-
making processes in Guyana, even in community meetings.273 The Administrator of the
Women’s Affairs Bureau, who conducts meetings across the country in different communities,
asked the Hindu community for a possible explanation for the visible absence of Indian women
at community gatherings. The response? “Because of their husbands.” The Administrator noted
that culture and religion account for this conservative approach and observed similar behaviour
within the Muslim community. It appears, therefore, that women’s culture and religion present
issues with their participation in public fora, whether such fora are politically-oriented or not.
5.2.5 The Recommendations that Went Forward
As mentioned above, the CRC received approximately 4,601 recommendations during
the public hearing period.274 Among the forty three recommendations that the CRC received
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related to women rights were suggestions for changes to constitutional provisions, including a
mandatory provision to ensure and encourage women’s participation in decision-making at all
levels. The recommendations stated that the provision should provide for a) one-third ratio of
inclusion of women or b) a 60:40 ratio of inclusion of women and men.275 While the CRC report
submitted to the National Assembly recognised these concerns, the section of the report that
outlined specific recommendations only made general, discretionary statements concerning
women’s participation in public decision-making and the inclusion of gender representativeness
in the electoral system.276 The recommendations stated:
….3) There should be an enshrined general principle which encourages women’s
participation in public decision-making so that national decisions which affect women
significantly can be informed by them. Parliament should be required to take measures
designed to increase women’s participation in the various processes and fora of
decision-making in society, including the National Assembly itself, to a level that takes
into account the proportion that women form of the society.….4) The Constitutional
provisions on the electoral systems, including electoral lists, should be informed by the
inclusion of requirements for gender, as well as geographical, representativeness.277
A letter sent to the OC Chairman noted that recommendation 4) refers to the fact that a
mechanism should be put in place that allows the entire electoral system to reflect a gender
balance, not just the electoral candidate party lists.278 This was supported by recommendation
3) which suggested that political participation and decision-making by women take into account
the proportion of women that form society. The law as it is currently drafted makes reference
only to the proportion of women included on electoral party lists.
The final OC report included similar non-specific language.279 The recommendations of
one-third or 60:40 were not ultimately put forward in any specific terms. “The Commission was
not persuaded that specific percentages should be set as targets but felt that as more women
are exposed to public life, the greater would be their participation.”280 This raises the question
as to how women could be exposed to public life. Moreover, the decision to use such non-
committal language contradicts the rationale for including recommendations concerning gender
equality in the first place, as stated by Professor Mahoney:
No country in the world treats its women as well as its men. Systemic and widespread
inequality and discrimination, often embedded in the national laws of countries, creates
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double jeopardy and double standards for women from all social classes, cultures, and
races, in all societies.281
5.3 The Legislative Framework for the Gender Quota System
Section 29 of the Constitution enshrines the notion of equality of the sexes in all
spheres of political, economic and social life.282 Yet, specific measures still should be taken to
ensure that de facto equality matches the de jure provisions for political participation. In this
regard, the revised Constitution contains enabling provisions in section 160(3) that address
three main issues related to women’s representation: extraction of women’s names from the
political party lists; the minimum proportion of female candidates to be placed on a party’s list;
and the maximum proportion of geographical constituencies in which a party may contest in
which its lists have no female candidate. Parliament passed the Elections Laws (Amendment)
Act, No 15 of 2000 to provide specificity to these provisions.
Sections 11B(5) and (6) of the Elections Laws (Amendment) Act mandate that the
national top-up list contain a minimum of one-third women and that the regional lists contain a
total of one-third women for the geographical constituencies in which the party contests.
Subsection (7) mandates that the maximum proportion of geographical constituencies that a
party may contest in which its lists have no female candidate cannot exceed twenty percent.
Subsection (8) deals with the contentious issue of extraction. It is crafted in such a way that
extraction of one-third women off the list is discretionary and not mandatory, despite the use of
mandatory language. Therefore, the latter provides no guarantee that one-third women will hold
seats in Parliament.283 To compound the matter, the representative of the list has full and
unfettered power of extraction pursuant to subsection (9) with no reference to gender.
Guyana, therefore, has the only legal quota system in the English-speaking Caribbean.
It ensures that all parties nominate one-third female candidates – which is sanctioned by
sections 14(1) and 17(1) that address “defective” lists (lists not meeting the one-third
requirement must be revised to be accepted). Parliament, however, has no obligation to
translate that one-third into representation. This presents a technical loophole, which can be
exploited.284
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Radzik, as well as numerous others, noted the unfortunate loophole in the law in the
2001 elections, which immediately followed the revision of Guyana’s constitution. While one-
third of the candidates on parties’ lists in the 2001 elections were women, one-third women
were not appointed to Parliament.285 Various women recognised that they “blew it,”286
“blundered,”287 and “made a mistake in…the niceties of the law.”288 They recognised their
mistake in not seeking clarification on what one-third women on the list meant in practice. This
was one of the concerns raised by the Red Thread delegation at their oral presentation to the
OC. The statement was even made that, “The leader of the CRC…did not give good advice on
the extraction matter.”289 Unfortunately, the system is structured in such a way that it does not
require any accountability outside the party. The party system is too strong, and civil society,
and within it, the women’s movement, is too weak.290
When women’s organisations argued before the OC the case for extraction off the list, it
engendered a debate within the CRC as to whether the issue of extraction should also be
enshrined in the constitution or in law.291 The agreement was that this was an incremental
issue, so the first step would be to get parties to comply with the requirement that one-third
women candidates must be placed on the list to be eligible to contest the elections, otherwise
the list would be “defective” and rejected. Given that the process focused on constitutional
reform at all levels, there was an attempt to reach consensus. The incremental approach was
felt to be a better one as Guyana is a multiparty country and some of the smaller parties would
require time to evolve. As such, it was not until the 2006 election that political parties sought to
place more women on their lists.
The system currently operates on the basis of asking individual parties to honour the
intent of the law (not just placing one-third women on the electoral list, but extracting at least
one-third as well). Prior to the 2011 elections, the Women and Gender Equality Commission,
established as part of the constitutional reforms, invited party leaders to ask them what they
were doing for women and to express to them what they expected. The parties answered
twelve questions; six of them and their responses are included in Table 5 below.292 Some
parties did not answer the questions at all, or their answers did not even seem to match the
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question asked. For example, the answer the PPP/C offered to question one does not actually
discuss the party’s policy on gender equality and inclusion, but identifies a method which it
employs to achieve it. The PPP/C response to question six also seems evasive, as the
question asks about national elections, but the response focuses on local government
elections, which have not taken place since 1994.293 The PPP/C provides yet another indirect
answer to question ten, which asks about parties’ intentions of proposing new laws or
amendments to existing laws related to gender equality and development.
One question, which is not included in Table 5, that the Women and Gender Equality
Commission asked all parties in 2011 was: “Did you actually place more than 35%, 40% or
50% [of women candidates] on any of your lists, although your party was only required to place
at least 30%? ALL PARTIES, except the PPP/C – YES.”294 While this author is not attacking the
PPP/C for its responses, it is noteworthy that their answers align with the fact that they are the
party that had the smallest percentage of women political representation in Guyana (see Table
6 below). During the 2011 questioning by the Women and Gender Equality Commission, one of
the commissioners noted her disappointment of the party responses on the subject of women
and gender, especially by the women party members.295
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Table 5: Political parties’ responses to questions posed by the Women and Gender Equality
Commission
Question 1: What is specifically stated in your party’s main policy documents in relation to gender equality
and involvement of women in the development process?
AFC The AFC stated that they recognised that greater gender equality and empowerment were
essential to eradicating poverty in Guyana since significant inequality in gender responsibility,
opportunity and influences still exists.
GAP/ROAR Stated unequivocally that women have to be integrally involved in the development process.
PNC/R The PNC/R-1G proffered that women’s development was very intertwined with country
development and the two should never be separated.
PPP/C The PPP/C purported that through the Women’s Progressive Organisation, women were
trained to take on leadership positions using the methodology of participatory democracy.
Question 4: In previous national and general elections, did your party experience difficulties in obtaining the




PPP/C PPP/C’s representative said that it was difficult to get the required 33% of women in some
areas but in totality the party was trying to get the required 33% in parliament.
Question 6: Will your party support a move to increase the required percentage of women on party elections
lists for the current up-coming election? If so, by what percentage?
AFC  --
GAP/ROAR The leadership must firstly, be based on competency, then gender.
PNC/R --
PPP/C The participation of women would be improved at the level of the community through the local
government elections
Question 9: What will your objectives be to having a higher percentage? Can you share with us your
proposed policies and programmes in relation to women?
AFC Its policy was to ensure that the women have an adequate voice in the party. They were
currently working on councillors across the country to have a gender balance and an open
platform for women to have a voice with training for both boys and girls.
GAP/ROAR Working on the training in values for young females and males.
PNC/R Conscious of the many issues affecting women, but noted that it was difficult to address these
as an opposition party because of the lack of finances. The party therefore depended on the
government to address these issues with suitable programmes.
PPP/C The party focused on economic development for women and training in the use of advanced
technology. The party will borrow from Brazil’s Social Policy to give cash to parents on the
condition that they send their children to school. The General Secretary alluded to the
government’s housing development programme, which aimed at providing one house per
family to improve family relationships. The funds from the LCDs will go directly to women and
the family.




GAP/ROAR The party will propose laws related to allowances or lack thereof for citizens who cared for
children.
PNC/R Priorities are for 1) safety of women and children, 2) education (to get children back to
school), and 3) jobs.
PPP/C Started training the Guyana police force to counsel victims of domestic violence.
Table 6 shows consistently high levels of women being extracted from all party lists.
The traditionally Indian party, the PPP/C, shows much lower numbers of women, consistent
across the period and with the responses noted in Table 5 above. Culture may have a role in
explaining these figures, which are the lowest of any party. It is interesting to note,
nevertheless, that the PPP/C’s electoral list comprised 36% women,296 3% more than required
by law.
Table 6: Percentage of women extracted off the list per party in elections held since the
implementation of the gender quota297
Party % of Women Representatives
2001 2006 2011
Alliance For Change N/A* 40% 42.9%
A Partnership for National Unity N/A* N/A* 34.6%
Guyana Action Party / Working People’s Alliance 100% N/A* N/A*
People’s National Congress/Reform 37% 31.8% N/A*
Peoples’ Progressive Party/Civic 23.5% 27.7% 25.8%
*In some cases, the parties/coalitions were not yet formed or ceased to be in existence in that particular form for the year in
question, hence the “N/A”
When compared to Table 7 below, the figures in Table 6 for the period post-quota adoption
indicate promise.
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Table 7: Number and percentage of women holding seats in parliament for the period 1992-
2011298
Year of elections held in
Guyana
Total # of seats in
parliament
# of women holding
seats in parliament
% of women holding
seats in parliament
1992 65 10 15.4%
1997 65 12 18.5%
2001 65 12 18.5%
2006 65 20 30.7%
2011 65 21 32.3%
Table 7 suggests that the number of women in parliament steadily increased (apart
from 1997 and 2001 which remained static) even before the gender quota was adopted in
2000. The ten-point jump between 2001 and 2006 is statistically significant, not only because it
approached the one-third percentage of women that those promoting the quota hoped would be
in parliament, but also because it aligns with the explanation provided above about countries
with similar political histories catapulting women into leadership positions. The situation seems
enhanced when combined with Guyana’s process of constitutional reform. Extraction of women
off of party candidate lists into actual parliament seats, therefore, does not seem to pose that
much of a challenge generally, based on Tables 5-7. What happens at the party level, however,
suggests that there is still some way to go before the original intent of the quota law is
honoured. Whether or when this may occur is not clear. If the trend of more women holding
seats in parliament each election year continues, the number of women in parliament after the
next election, which is constitutionally due in 2016, should exceed one-third.
Such issues do not arise on the Amerindian village councils, as women have been
elected as Toshaos (captain of the villages) for hundreds of years.299 This population is way
ahead of the rest of Guyana in terms of positive attitudes toward women holding leadership
positions. Currently, the chairperson of the National Toshaos Council is a woman, representing
some 150 Amerindian village councils. The Minister of Amerindian Affairs and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs are both Amerindian women as well, suggesting Amerindian women are well
integrated into the national election process.
B. Prioritisation of the List
Prioritisation of the list goes hand in hand with extraction. Currently, Guyana’s lists are
closed but non-prioritised (parties can choose candidates regardless of their place on the list).
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If the enabling provision of the Constitution were strengthened by an Elections Laws
(Amendment) Act, this law has the potential to ensure that women will be chosen from the list
using some manner of rank-order system, such as the ‘zipper system’ or a ceiling to ensure that
a minimum number of women candidates features on the upper part of the list. While the quota
law includes a recommendation for implementation of a rank-order system, no party
acquiesced as they were not “comfortable” with such a move.300 In fact, three elections have
passed since the adoption of the quota law with no extraction requirement, and no one has
moved to address the issue, which suggests a lack of political will to change the status quo of a
limited number of women holding seats in parliament.
C. Substantive Representation
Does a gender quota ensure that parliament addresses women’s issues? The answer is
no, at least in Guyana’s experience. Most interview respondents for this chapter agreed that
once elected women politicians become self-serving and more concerned with power than with
the women’s agenda. Quite often, the more vocal women act as “guard-dogs” for their parties in
parliament.301 Women politicians often hold “soft” positions. Parties nurture them to think that if
they want to get ahead politically this is what they must do. The ones that speak out are
marginalised;302 even if they come into positions of power, many do not seem to be gender
conscious. Education Minister Priya Manickchand, for example, began her career with
widespread consultations on the issue of changing the law with respect to violence against
women and was able to provoke public response on the issue. In 2008, Manickchand
spearheaded a nationwide “Stamp It Out” campaign to deal with violence against women and
children.303 During her time as Minister of Human Services and Social Security, many noted
she had “the kind of empathetic personality required to advance the women’s agenda. She
demonstrated heart and had her hand on the pulse where women and children’s issues were
concerned.”304 She seems since, however, to have become “partyocratised”305 such that this
consultative behaviour waned over time.
Some progressive women (and men) feel the issue of parliamentary representation of
women is disdainful. They perceive the women’s agenda as subversive. In fact, pockets of
women in the country did not agree with instituting the gender quota. One middle-class woman
said that every time the women’s movement goes out to fight for something, it creates more
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pressure (responsibility) for women (to assume both traditional and new roles). Unfortunately,
not all women see women’s advancement in the same light.306
Overall, women in parliament are not really doing justice to women’s issues, but how
can the women’s movement unite them to do so? The cross-party caucus on women’s issues
never materialised in an official manner, despite mechanisms available to facilitate this. This
would have been useful, as these women are already members of political parties and would
be able to raise issues of importance to women with their party leaders. While the major parties
have long-standing women’s arms that do address such issues, it might work better if the
various arms came together to promote the issues jointly. Party politics, however, determine
which matters parties prioritise. In the absence of a formal cross-party mechanism, women’s
organisations can still request the Women and Gender Commission to take up women’s
issues.307 As a constitutionally established commission, however, it should be able to do this
already.308 In addition, women’s NGOs, as well as other interest groups, can and should push
for change where women political representatives are not seeking their best interests. NGOs in
the country have in fact been responsible for legislative gains for the advancement of women’s
issues since the quota law was implemented in Guyana.  The Sexual Offences Act, 2010, was
enacted after much agitation by women’s and other rights groups, such as the Guyana Human
Rights Association.309 These groups were instrumental in commenting on the provisions of the
act.310 Currently, women’s groups in Guyana are educating persons, particularly women, about
how the act works. Red Thread, for instance, produced a first draft of a “household guide,”
which presents a simplified version of the act to assist grassroots women to understand their
rights thereunder.311 In addition, in December 2010, Help & Shelter Inc., an NGO established in
1995 to address all types of violence, especially domestic violence and child abuse,
coordinated a presentation for the general public to explain the Act in more simplified terms.312
While rights groups were instrumental in lobbying for the enactment of this piece of
legislation, however, it is not clear what role women parliamentarians played in the process.
Other pieces of legislation that directly address women’s rights that women’s groups in Guyana
helped advance were enacted prior to the adoption of the gender quota and thus not directly
attributable to increased women’s presence in Parliament (See Appendix B for examples).
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Between 1989 and 1991 CARICOM  introduced a package of model legislation in six
critical areas related to women’s issues,313 which may have provided the foundation for some of
these pieces of enacted legislation, especially given their year of enactment. The six issues that
the model legislation package covered included citizenship, domestic violence, equal pay,
inheritance, sexual harassment, and sexual offences. In 1991, CARICOM drafted additional
model legislation that addressed equal opportunity and treatment in employment and
maintenance.314 Since legislation was enacted in Guyana concerning such issues shortly after
CARICOM drafted the model legislation, it is reasonable to surmise that CARICOM’s efforts
were highly influential in the process. No women parliamentarians, however, attempted to
rectify the various flaws in this legislation to advance women’s issues, suggesting again that
increasing women’s seats in parliament does not necessarily equate to advancing women’s
issues in the country.
In stark contrast, Indian women who were elected into the panchayat system due to the
gender quota seemed to translate into substantive increased representation of women’s issues.
How does one account for the differences in the panchayats and parliaments? It may be that
the panchayat represents a town/village, while parliament represents the nation.
Implementation of decisions at the lower local level may be simpler and less bureaucratic than
at the national level. Another possible explanation may be that because legislation in Guyana
meets women’s basic needs, women politicians do not deem additional legal rights as pressing
and do not address them with the same vigor as women politicians at the local level. While
these conclusions are merely speculative, they provide potential explanations for the glaring
difference.
D. Challenging the System
Some say that there is no incentive to lobby for making it mandatory that parties select
one-third of women off their candidate lists to hold seats in Parliament, because current women
representatives do not seek women’s interests. Roopnaraine notes that just because desired
outcomes have not resulted from the quota law thus far, it is not a good enough reason to give
up the fight to promote mechanisms that would assist in advancing women’s issues in the
country. He believes that civil society should keep trying to empower women, sensitise women
parliamentarians about women’s issues and to keep challenging the status quo. The philosophy
is that the more women who hold seats in parliament does positively influence change in
governmental institutional culture.315
                                                 




Many remain disappointed, despite the steady increase in women in parliament since
1992 and the apparent intent by most of the political parties to honour the desired outcome of
the quota law. It appears that many take for granted the struggle to legally adopt the quota law.
It is likely necessary at this point to start another movement to influence women in parliament to
push for a one-third extraction as a legally-binding measure. These women politicians,
however, need to push it for themselves, know how to lobby to get it done, and have like-
minded men on their side who will be vocal about it.316
One barrier is that young women take their gained rights for granted and do not see the
need to fight further. Practical hindrances to women’s entry into political life include their roles
as wives, mothers and caregivers, a lack of adequate training and political savvy, lack of
finances, lack of support, and the widespread perception that politics is “dirty and ugly.”317
Women generally need education on all these issues.
The Guyana Women’s Leadership Institute plays a very important role in educating and
training women for all leadership positions, not just political ones. The organisation’s mission
statement is to “develop, promote and support women and girls as leaders and decision
makers through education and training in order to facilitate equal access and full participation in
leadership and decision-making processes throughout the Guyanese society.”318
The major role of the Guyana Women’s Leadership Institute continues to be women’s
empowerment. It focuses on leadership training at two broad levels:
• Personal leadership – building women’s self-esteem and self-confidence,
motivating them to have a greater appreciation of themselves, and developing
interpersonal skills.
• Public leadership – building women’s self-confidence to prepare them for
effective participation in public life and decision-making, increased participation in
civic life, and to take advantage of opportunities to empower them economically.
Currently, the Institute’s program targets primarily grassroots women to prepare them for active
participation in political, social and economic spectrums. The multifaceted curricula address
areas such as leadership and decision-making, women’s legal status, the economy, small
business management and women’s health. Recently, the organisation has begun to take their
programs into rural locations to also educate women in these geographic areas.319
In relation to political leadership, the institute prepares women to be candidates at all
political levels, including neighbourhood democratic councils (village), regional democratic
councils (local government), and parliament (national).320 The Women’s Affairs Bureau
complements these services by holding seminars on leadership and gender equity issues for
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women throughout the country.321 These can be, and are, used as mechanisms to groom
young women and help them understand the importance of equal and full participation in
decision-making processes and leadership. They may help to reinvigorate the “extraction”
cause, even though Table 6 above seems to suggest that the majority of political parties adhere
to gender quotas.
In 2002, the Guyana Association of Women Lawyers, in collaboration with the
Organisation of American States, also sponsored training for women aspiring to be in, or who
are in politics. The training, which was well received, addressed issues related to leadership,
how to handle the media, budgeting (including the importance of gender budgeting), grooming
and deportment, and public speaking.322
E. Implementation
Implementation strategies are lacking. Lack of resources affects proper implementation.
The Women and Gender Equality Commission, for example, was only operationalized in 2010,
ten years after the constitutional reform provided for the establishment of the commission.323
One former CRC commissioner noted that it was highly disappointing that it took so long for the
actual operationalization of the commission, as this was indicative of a lack of political will and
chauvinistic reluctance to really institutionalize the amended provisions. The revised Sexual
Offences Act also has not been properly implemented due to inherent legal/constitutional
oversights.
6.0 Conclusion: Is the Struggle Worth It?
On the balance, yes. Even though there is widespread disillusionment among those in
Guyana who engaged in the struggle for the quota with respect to extraction and substantive
representation, as party interests usually eclipse women’s issues, they achieved the
feminisation of the party lists. This should be seen as a critical step forward which must be
complemented by further lobbying and dialogue towards the “feminisation of parliament.””324
The Women and Gender Equality Commission has begun such dialogue at an informal level
with political parties, requesting that they honour the intent of the legislative measure. Deeply
gendered cultural perspectives have thwarted this vision, however, as the PPP/C has not ever
met the one-third minimum in the National Assembly since the adoption of the quota law. It
should be noted that gendered and cultural resistance come from men and women and present
a very real challenge, despite Guyana’s history of female political leadership and strong
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women’s arms within the two main political parties. Conservative women express apathy and
irritation by the gains of the women’s movement as they relate to political representation.
Although quotas are ostensibly designed to promote diversity and inclusiveness, the
quota policies today rarely challenge majority men’s dominance of national legislatures.325
Numbers alone are insufficient. One writer questions whether quota strategies are too focussed
on attaining power and increasing women’s numerical count within structures characterized by
inequality.326 This becomes a tautological argument, as numbers are indeed required to effect
institutional and structural changes. Attempting to chip away at male dominance and structural
inequalities from the outside will be of little value. Moreover, once inside, and on condition that
women representatives are willing to pursue women’s issues, women can become agents of
real and effective change. Ideational change, of course, must complement numerical
increases,327 which requires constant sensitisation and education of both sexes, preferably from
very young, to root out deeply gendered and prevailing notions of political representation. This
will eventually create the enabling environmental necessary, as resistance would be less
pervasive.
Are quotas an acceptable means of including women in the political process? Based on
the socio-political contexts of any given country (apart from the Nordic countries), quotas may
very well be the only way that women may grace the halls of parliament. They are tools towards
women’s empowerment that must not be squandered once they are obtained. Deeply gendered
and patriarchal attitudes are likely to keep women out of leadership positions. Double quotas
may be necessary, in fact, due to deeply gendered and patriarchal attitudes that will continue to
keep women out of leadership positions. As seen in the case of the PPP/C, the single quota
has not led to one-third women actually holding seats in parliament. As the former Minister for
Culture and Communication of Haiti eloquently commented, “the quota is therefore a
safeguard, an instrument, a legal tool until such time as these responses become systematic
and we are no longer constrained to refer to them because we are obliged by law to do so.”328
The objective of establishing special temporary measures is that they will eventually no longer
be special or temporary, but natural and pervasive. Certain structural changes may be
necessary, however, to assist women with child care, for example, while they become involved
in political life.
Quota adoption and implementation is not a case of one size fits all; what has worked in
one country may not work in another. The success of any quota system is country-specific and,
therefore, highly contextual. While ensuring that one-third of candidates extracted from party
lists for seats in parliament are women may be a concessionary tactic and downward
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compromise from ensuring 60:40 percentages or parity, it is one step forward. The struggle falls
to the women’s movement. Usually, this type of struggle requires the support of at least one
well-placed elite man to promote the cause,329 as illustrated in the examples provided earlier, as
well as political will to move the issue forward. It is important to note the distinction between the
legislature and the executive to appreciate the notion of political will. While women legislators
can influence the legislative agenda, it is the executive that makes the decisions as to what is
placed on the legislative agenda in the first place and then determines whether and how such
law will be implemented. Therefore, while the minimum number of women may be elected and
placed in parliament, the number of women who form part of the Executive may be key to
advancing women’s issues.330 Regardless, moving the extraction issue forward entails
reinvigorating the movement or passing the baton on to younger women. The latter will need
strong role models to emulate and to help them understand the importance of the battle they
must wage. Women have to be prepared to fight and stand up for themselves; the veterans
must also be prepared to nurture the young ones.331 The Guyana’s Women Leadership
Institute, as well as other organisations, plays a critical role in this process which is
supplemented by the activities of the Women’s Affairs Bureau.
The extent of women’s formal participation in politics is an important marker for
women’s empowerment. The premise is that increasing women’s participation in
political processes, as both voters and candidates, will change the nature and
functioning of public institutions, which will ultimately influence future development
decisions and create a more equitable, gender-responsive and humane society.332
                                                 
329 Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics, 22 and Krook, “Candidate Gender Quotas,” 370.
330 The role of the executive in pursuing women’s issues might be the subject of further research.
331 Chanderpal.
332 Kudva, “Engineering Elections,” 446.
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Appendix A
Constitution of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Cap. 1:01.
29. (1) Women and men have equal rights and the same legal status in all spheres of political,
economic and social life. All forms of discrimination against women on the basis of their sex are
illegal.
160. (3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make provision - (a)(ii) for
the manner in which lists of candidates shall be prepared, including the provision in a list of the
names of a sufficient number of candidates to enable any vacancies to be filled under
subparagraph (vii), and which manner shall allow voters to be sure which individuals they are
electing to the National Assembly.
(v) for the extraction from the lists and declaration of names of the candidates who have been
elected, and for such provision for extraction to take into account the proportion that women
form of the electorate;
(b) (iii) for the minimum number or proportion of female candidates on a party’s list for
geographical constituencies taken individually or together;
(iv) for the maximum percentage or the number of geographical constituencies a party can
contest in which its lists contain no female candidate.
Representation of the People Act, Cap. 1:03, amended by Elections Laws
(Amendment) Act, No 15 of 2000
11. B (5) The total number of females on each party’s national top-up list shall be at least one-
third of the total number of persons on that list.
(6) The total number of females on any party’s lists for geographical constituencies, taken
together, shall be at least one-third of the total number of persons on those lists taken together
for the geographical constituencies in which that party is contesting.
(7) There shall be no more than twenty percent of the number of geographical constituencies in
which a party is contesting for which the party’s geographical constituency list contains no
female.
(8) In the extraction from the list declaration of names of the candidates who have been elected
account shall be taken –
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(i) of the total number of females on each party’s national top-up lists and the lists for
geographical constituencies, taken together, being at least one-third of the number of persons
on those lists as mentioned in paragraphs (5), (6) and (7); and
(ii) of the proportion that women formed of the electorate.
(9) The order in which a party states the names of candidates on its lists shall be as the party
deems fits.
14. (1) If it appears to the Commission that a list of candidates is defective, that is to say, that its
list or its submission does not comply in all respects with the requirements of section 11(1), (2),
(3), (4), (5) or section 11B…the Chief Election Officer shall so inform the representative and the
deputy representative of the list, specifying the defects…
15. The representative and the deputy representative of a list of candidates, or either of them,
may…submit to the Chief Election Officer corrections of any defects in the list…
17. (1) …no list of candidates shall be valid unless it has been approved by the Commission…
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Appendix B
The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1995 resulted from a well-coordinated effort of
women across political, social and ethnic divides. Like the Sexual Offences Act, however,
issues remain with implementation. While abortions are now legal in Guyana, women still die
from unsafe abortions executed by unlicensed practitioners, which is a direct consequence of
the government not enforcing the act.  As a result, women’s rights activists continue to lobby
the government to do so.333
Other important pieces of legislation that seek to advance women’s rights that were enacted
prior to the institution of the gender quota include:
• Domestic Violence Act, No 18 of 1996, which provides protection to victims of domestic
violence;
• Prevention of Discrimination Act, No 26 of 1997, which recognizes women’s rights to
equal opportunity and treatment in any employment or occupation by stipulating that
discrimination on the grounds of sex, indigenous population, social origin, economic status,
family responsibilities, pregnancy and marital status is prohibited. It also prohibits acts of
sexual harassment of any employee by an employer, managerial employee or co-worker.
• Children Born out of Wedlock (Removal of Discrimination Act), No. 12 of 1983
removes legal discrimination against children born out of wedlock so that they are given
equal treatment to children born between married couples.
• Equal Rights Act, No 19 of 1990, which recognizes women’s and men’s rights as
equal, and makes provisions for them to have the same legal status in all spheres of
political, economic and social life.
• Termination of Employment and Severance Pay Act, No.19 of 1997, which makes
provisions that remove discrimination against pregnant women such that they cannot be
terminated simply due to pregnancy.
• Married Persons (Property) (Amendment) Act, No. 20 of 1991, which provides for the
division of property of married persons, and recognizes  common law unions and the division
of property among them.334
                                                 
333 Newswatch Guyana, “Women’s Rights Activists Call for Enforcement of the Medical Termination Act of Guyana.”
334 See “Guyana’s Response.”
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